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INTRODUCTION
In August 2010, Alaskan voters approved a law mandating that young
women under eighteen years old give a parent notice of their intent to have
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Many
thanks to Anne Dellinger, Nancy Dowd, Paul Gugliuzza, Janet Halley, Johanna Kalb,
Carol Sanger, Elizabeth Scott, Marya Torrez, the participants and organizers of the Uni-
versity of Baltimore Applied Feminism and Marginalized Communities Conference, and
the Family Law Junior Faculty Workshop at William & Mary Law School. All errors are
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an abortion.' The ballot initiative follows litigation over the previous law,2
intense public debate,3 and speculation about the prospects of future chal-
lenges.4 With the addition of Alaska, a total of thirty-seven states will have
laws that require a minor to involve her parents in her abortion decision,
typically either by notifying a parent or by seeking a parent's permission.'
Thirty-five of those states permit a minor to "bypass" notice or consent re-
quirements by allowing a minor to prove in a court hearing that she is ma-
ture or that an abortion is in her best interests. 6
The stated objectives of parental involvement laws are to protect the
health and well-being of minors and to encourage dialogue between parents
and adolescents about pregnancy options.7 Yet decades of studies urge that
parental involvement laws do not meet these purposes.' Adding to this re-
search, a new ethnography of professionals who implement parental involve-
ment statutes seeks to demonstrate how notice and consent laws and the
' ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(3) (2010); see also Alaskan Voters Approve Parental
Notification Ballot Initiative, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Aug. 26, 2010, http://www.medical
newstoday.com/articles/199006.php.
2 See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577 (Alaska 2007) (hold-
ing the parental consent law unconstitutional).
See, e.g., ALASKANS AGAINST GOVERNMENT MANDATES: PROTECT OUR TEENS AND
FAMILIES, http://www.facebook.com/NOon2AK (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); ALASKANS
FOR PARENTAL RIGHTS, YES ON 2, http://www.alaskansforparentalrights.org/ (last visited
Oct. 25, 2010).
4 See, e.g., Lisa Demer, Voters Approve Measure Requiring Abortion Notification,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.adn.com/2010/08/25/1423557/vot
ers-approve-measure-requiring.html ("The measure's opponents said they will look into
the possibility of another court challenge.").
'GUTrMACHER INST., PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS' ABORTIONS (Nov. 1,
2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibPIMA.pdf. The
Guttmacher report describes the parental involvement laws of thirty-four states, but omits
the current laws of Maryland, Alaska, and Maine. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.16.010(a)(3),
18.16.030 (2010) (mandating parental notice and creating judicial bypass as alternative);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103(a), (c) (LexisNexis 2009) (mandating notice and
creating a physician waiver but not a judicial bypass); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22
§ 1597-A(2)(A-C), (6) (2004) (requiring state counseling, parental or adult family mem-
ber consent, or court order via a judicial bypass hearing).
6 See GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 5 (listing the states that have a judicial bypass,
though excluding Maryland (which has a notice statute but no judicial bypass provision),
Alaska, and Maine).
7 For an example of the legislative purposes of parental involvement laws, see ALA.
CODE § 26-21-1(a) (2009) ("It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this parental
consent provision to further the important and compelling state interests of: (1) protecting
minors against their own immaturity, (2) fostering the family structure and preserving it
as a viable social unit, and (3) protecting the rights of parents to rear children who are
members of their household.").
I See, e.g., Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 687-93 (1988) (summarizing
studies showing that parental involvement laws fail to meet their stated aims because, for
example, adolescents have the cognitive ability to make abortion decisions); AMANDA
DENNIS ET AL., THE IMPACT OF LAWS REQUIRING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FOR ABORTION:
A LITERATURE REVIEW 27-28 (March 2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/ParentallnvolvementLaws.pdf (summarizing studies that show abortion rates do not
necessarily decrease with consent or notice laws).
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judicial bypass work in practice.9 Over the last two years, a non-profit or-
ganization, the National Partnership for Women & Families, interviewed 155
lawyers, advocates, judges, health care providers, and court clerks who assist
minors in every state with parental notice or consent laws and judicial by-
pass petitions. 0 The National Partnership's final report makes clear that a
significant population of minors cannot consult their parents for logistical or
personal reasons, and, for that cohort, the judicial bypass is not a meaningful
alternative." In only a few places can the judicial bypass system be de-
scribed as a functional process in which most minors, from any part of a
state, can seek a bypass without significant delay, cost, or embarrassment.
This Article relies on the findings of the National Partnership's study,
but addresses an aspect of parental involvement laws that has garnered scant
scholarly attention-strategies for reform when repeal or injunction of a law
is unlikely. Reproductive health and youth rights advocates have challenged
consent and notice laws in court, through appeals to state legislators to re-
peal or revise laws, and in campaigns designed to shape public attitudes
about adolescent abortion. 2 The opposition to minor's access to abortion is
equally vigorous, and pro-choice advocates spend substantial energy oppos-
ing bills that would make parental involvement laws more restrictive.'
Moreover, policies governing parental involvement are often unclear and in-
formation about the judicial bypass is not widely available. 14 Legal and
clinical professionals at the state and local levels make choices based on
unwritten policies driven by fears of liability, anti-abortion attitudes, or an-
' NATL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BYPASSING JUSTICE: PREGNANT MINORS
AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS 6 (2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter BYPASSING
JUSTICE]. The author was an associate director of adolescent health programs at the Na-
tional Partnership and co-authored BYPASSING JUSTICE with Anne Dellinger, former direc-
tor of adolescent health programs. For additional information about the bypass project,
see NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, www.nationalpartnership.org (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
'0 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 8. All study participants agreed to be inter-
viewed on the promise of confidentiality-that neither they nor their locale would be
identified. For this reason, this article does not refer to interviewees by name and does
not make reference to the jurisdictions from which examples are drawn. Moreover, only
members of the "reproductive health community" received copies of the report.
" See Ted Joyce, Parental Consent for Abortion and the Judicial Bypass Option in
Arkansas: Effects and Correlates, 42 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 168, 173
(2010) (noting that ten percent of Arkansas minors seeking an abortion petitioned for a
judicial bypass and comparing that with the estimate that forty percent of minors would
choose not to consult parents without the consent law).
2 See infra Part III (describing the three common strategies employed by reproduc-
tive rights advocates).
" See infra Part III(B) (describing, for example, the bills that pro-choice advocates
oppose in state legislatures). A women's rights advocate reflected the feelings of those
that oppose parental involvement by stating, "We've been down so long we don't know
how to get up." NAT'L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, REPORT ON A MEETING ON
THE JUDICIAL BYPASS 16 (2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter REPORT ON A MEETING]
(summary of the proceedings of a national meeting of fifty experts involved in adolescent
reproductive health and knowledgeable about judicial bypass).
" See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 7-8.
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tipathy for adolescent sexuality." This Article explains why typical propos-
als for reform-to revise statutory language, to change public perceptions of
the "good parent" and "bad teen," or to challenge aspects of consent or
notice laws in court-have limited potential.
I argue that those interested in easing the burden that parental involve-
ment laws impose on young women might intervene at the level of informal
decision-making.' 6 Insights from new governance scholarship show how in-
fluencing local relationships among gatekeepers of services can help over-
come obstacles to reform. Generally, new governance is a method of law
reform that "responds to critiques of rights-based, state-centered, top-down
litigative and regulatory strategies by turning toward experimental, flexible,
collaborative public-private partnerships and by locating lawyers as problem
solvers rather than as traditional advocates."" The problem-solving method
of new governance provides an approach that can address the complex web
of state oversight, parental control, social stigma, and the discretion of indi-
vidual legal actors. I temper my suggestion that new governance could play
a role in reform with an assessment of its risks and limitations.a My pur-
pose is not to suggest that new governance is a seamless fit for parental
involvement laws or provides a clear, unproblematic path for change. My
intent, rather, is to advance the current conversation among those interested
in increasing minors' access to reproductive health care services and improv-
ing the operation of parental involvement laws.
Parts I and II of this Article provide background on parental consent
and notice standards and relate relevant findings from the National Partner-
ship's research. Part III explores why traditional strategies based on court or
legislative intervention may not be viable avenues of change. In Part IV, I
identify the risks and potential rewards of a new governance approach and
reflect on background conditions that would make its application challeng-
ing. The Article concludes by offering a hypothetical model for collabora-
tion that applies a new governance approach to the judicial bypass.
' See infra Part II(E) (describing state officials' confusion about or opposition to the
requirements of parental involvement laws of accepting notice or granting consent for
minors in state care).
'6 See infra Part IV(B) (relying on the recommendations of interviewees in formulat-
ing a new strategy).
7Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OH1o Sr. L.J. 323, 324-25
(2009); see infra Part IV(A) (defining new governance and describing its problem-solv-
ing potential).
18 See infra Part IV(C) (considering potentially negative implications of a new gov-
ernance approach).
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I. THE LETTER OF THE LAW: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT STATUTES
A. Background and Types of Parental Involvement
The United States Supreme Court sketched out the general require-
ments for parental involvement laws over thirty years ago. In its 1979 deci-
sion, Bellotti v. Baird, the Court considered a Massachusetts law that
required parental consent before a minor elected abortion. 9 The Court held
that a parental consent law must include an alternative to parental consent:
minors who are mature and well-informed or for whom an abortion would
be in their best interests must be able to take advantage of a process that is
timely, confidential, and effective.2 0 Today, in almost every state that has a
parental consent or notice law, the alternative process is a court hearing
where a judge determines the minor-petitioner's maturity or best interests as
set out by the state's statute.21
State legislatures have passed parental involvement laws in forty-four
states. 22 Thirty-seven states have an involvement law in force 23 with the laws
of seven other states enjoined or, for one state, repealed.2 4 There are basi-
cally two types of parental involvement laws-those that require the abor-
'9 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979).
20 Id. at 643-44.
21 See GurTMACHER INST., supra note 5 (noting the thirty-seven states with parental
involvement laws). In three states-Maryland, West Virginia, and Maine-a healthcare
provider can determine when a minor is not obligated to involve a parent. Maryland
(which has no judicial bypass) and West Virginia (which does) allow providers to assess
maturity or best interests as a court would. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-103(c)
(LexisNexis 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2F-3(c) (LexisNexis 2006). Maine's statute
gives the minor the option of a bypass hearing or state-mandated counseling, which is
delivered by a provider who describes, among other things, the alternatives to and risks of
abortion; encourages minors to consult with parents; and records the minors' reasons for
not seeking parental consent. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1597-A(2-4) (2004).
22 Six states-Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington-
and the District of Columbia have not passed a law mandating parental involvement of all
minors. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 5. A Connecticut statute provides for coun-
seling about the value of parental notification for minors, but does not mandate it. CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-601 (2010).
23 See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 5.
24 The following six decisions enjoin the parental involvement laws in their respec-
tive states: Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming lower court's enjoin-
ment of Nevada's parental consent requirement because it did not meet the state
constitutional requirements, including expediency, for such provisions); Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (holding that the parental consent statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the right of privacy); The Hope Clinic for Wo-
men Ltd. v. Adams, No. 09-CH-38661, 2010 WL 1198356 (111. Cir. Mar. 29, 2010);
Wicklund v. Montana, No. ADV 97-671, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116 (D. Mont. 1999)
(finding that Montana's parental notice requirement violated equal protection); Planned
Parenthood v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (holding that New Jersey's parental
notification requirement violated state equal protection); N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-19,
1990 WL 509590 (N.M.A.G. Oct. 3, 1990) (declaring New Mexico's parental notification
law unenforceable because, among other reasons, the statute does not provide for a by-
pass procedure). New Hampshire is the only state to have repealed a parental-notification
law. Press Release, N.H. Gen. Court, Senate Votes To Repeal Unconstitutional Parental
2011] 179
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tion provider to obtain consent from the minor's parent before an abortion is
performed (consent laws) and those that require the abortion provider to give
a parent notice before the abortion occurs (notice laws).2 5 Mississippi and
North Dakota require consent from both parents, and Minnesota requires
notice to both parents.2 6 Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming require both
notice and consent. 27
Notice laws require abortion providers to give a parent either actual
notice (notification delivered in person or by telephone) or constructive no-
tice.28 Laws typically mandate that providers give constructive notice to a
parent by special delivery, which requires the addressee to present valid
identification that confirms her identity upon delivery. 29 State statutes re-
quire varying time periods for constructive notice: many laws mandate 48
hours and some 72 hours before the abortion. 0 If notice is delivered in per-
son or by telephone, typically only 24 hours notice is required.', For consent
statutes, providers must obtain oral or written consent from the parent or
adult(s) designated by statute.3 2
Common to notice and consent laws is the requirement that providers
use "'reasonable means' to notify parents or to obtain consent or to learn a
patient's age."" Statutes do not typically set out how a minor must prove
her age or how providers must verify a patient's age.34 Moreover, few states
detail what evidence a parent must give to prove her relationship with the
Notice Law (June 7, 2007), available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/senate/press/
2007/parental%20notice%20repeal.htm.
25 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 10.2 6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(Subd. 2-3) (West 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
53(1) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(1)(a) (2009). North Dakota's two-parent
consent only applies when both parents are living and married to each other. Mississippi
law allows one parent to consent if the other is unavailable. Similarly, only one parent
need receive notice in Minnesota if the other parent is dead or cannot be found.
27 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740.2 (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002
(Vernon 2008); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 164.052(a)(19) (1999 & Vernon Supp. 2009);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304-304,5 (2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(a) (2009).
28 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 11. Only one state, Delaware, requires actual
notice without the option of constructive notice. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783 (1997).29 
BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 11.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Fifteen statutes specify that consent must be in writing and signed, and five of
these states require notarization. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-803(a)(5), 803(c)
(2009) (notarized consent or witnessed signature); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.5(A)(1) (2008) (notarized consent); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1
(2009) (written consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740.2(3)(a) (West 2010) ("parent
entitled to notice and consent shall provide to the physician a copy of proof of identifica-
tion, and shall certify in a signed, dated, and notarized statement that he or she has been
notified and consents to the abortion"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31(A)(1) (2002) (wit-
nessed signature); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010) (notarized consent unless "au-
thorized person" present with minor and provides written authorization witnessed by
physician).
3 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 11.
34 Id. But see ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(b) (2010) (repealed and reenacted) (detail-
ing what reasonable steps a provider must take to give notice).
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minor. For example, five state laws require the person consenting or receiv-
ing notice to present identification or documentation that establishes the re-
lationship between the parent/guardian and the minor." Arkansas, for
example, requires photographic identification (with notarized written con-
sent in lieu of in-person consent)-proof of which providers must keep for
five years.36
Six of the thirty-seven state statutes in force allow a non-parent adult to
give consent or to accept notice-generally, an adult who acts like a parent
to the minor. Virginia permits consent by a "[p]erson standing in loco
parentis," such as a grandparent or adult sibling, "with whom the minor
regularly and customarily resides and who has care and control of the mi-
nor."3 7 Wisconsin permits consent from an adult family member, such as a
grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling, who is at least twenty-five years old.
Laws in Delaware, Iowa, North Carolina, and South Carolina allow a grand-
parent to give consent or receive notice.
Finally, some statutes create specific categories of minors that do not
have to comply with notice and consent standards at all. Minors sixteen or
older do not need to notify a parent in Delaware, and seventeen-year-olds are
exempt from the consent law in South Carolina. 40 Almost all notice or con-
sent laws allow emancipated minors to make abortion decisions without
their parents, although the definition of emancipation varies from state to
state.4 1 As set out in Virginia's consent statute, an emancipated minor can be
a youth emancipated by a court, married or divorced, in the armed forces, or
"willingly living separate and apart from her parents or guardian, with the
" ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-803 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(b)(1) (2010) (re-
pealed and reenacted); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (a)(1)(A) (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-740.2(3)(a) (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (2005 & Supp. 2008)
("written documentation, other than the written consent itself, that purports to establish
the relationship of the parent or guardian to the minor").36 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-803(d-e) (2009).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010).
" Wis. STAT. § 48.375(4)(1) (2007-08) (providing that an adult family member may
be provided with consent); Wis. STAT. § 48.375(2)(b) (2007-08) (noting that a grandpar-
ent, aunt, uncle, sister, or brother, age twenty-five or older, constitutes an adult family
member).
39 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(a) (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(m)(2)(a)
(West 2007) (upon "written statement submitted to the attending physician" describing
"a reason for not notifying a parent and a reason for notifying a grandparent," minor may
give notice to a grandparent); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.7(a)(4) (2009) ("grandpar-
ent with whom the minor has been living for at least six months immediately preceding
the date of the minor's written consent" may give consent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
31(A)(1)(c)-(d) (2002) (noting that a grandparent or someone "who has been standing in
loco parentis to the minor for a period not less than sixty days" may give consent).
'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1782(6), 1783 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-
10(m), 44-41-31 (2002).
4' But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 2002) (no exception for
emancipated minors). Massachusetts has a law that sets out the requirements for emanci-
pation in making medical decisions, but this provision excludes abortion. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West 2002).
2011] 181
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consent or acquiescence of the parents or guardian." 42 Most statutes provide
that married minors can make abortion decisions without parental involve-
ment or a bypass. 43 Some laws define living apart in terms of a minor's
ability to support herself financially outside of the parental home."
In addition to independent minors, several statutes make exceptions for
minors who have destructive relationships with their parents or whose
pregnancies may be the result of sexual assault. For example, some statutes
exempt minors from the requirements of notice or consent if they have been
abused, neglected, or sexually assaulted. 45 Many of these laws apply the
exemption only when the parent or guardian is the perpetrator. 46 The evi-
dence needed to establish abuse or assault, and what a provider must do in
response to learning this information, varies. 47
Almost all states allow physicians to perform abortions without parental
involvement or a judicial bypass if a minor has a medical emergency. 48
Some laws define emergency as an instance where continued pregnancy
would compromise a minor's health, safety, or well-being.49 Others are more
restrictive, defining medically necessary abortions as those that are needed
42 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010).
43 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(3)(b)(3) (West 2007). In most states, unemanci-
pated adolescents under eighteen years old need parental consent or a court order to
marry. See Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
LEGAL INFO. INST., http://topics.law.comell.edu/wex/table-marriage (last visited Oct. 26,
2010).
"See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121(A) (Lexis Nexis 2010) (defining
emancipated minor as one who "has married, entered the armed services of the United
States, become employed and self-subsisting, or has otherwise become independent from
the care and control of her parent, guardian, or custodian").
4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(c)(4)(b) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.
011 14(4)(d) (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.8(e)(3) (2009); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.85(4)(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
46 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(G)(1) (2009 & Supp. 2009) (perpetra-
tor must be a relative, guardian, or adult who lives with the minor and the minor's
mother); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-105(b) (2010) (perpetrator must be person
who would receive notice) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-609A(7)(a) (2004 & Supp.
2009) (perpetrator must be relative, guardian, or foster parent).
47 For example, in Wisconsin, a minor must provide a signed statement that the preg-
nancy is a result of sexual assault or abuse. Wis. STAT. § 48.375(4)(b)(lg) (2007-08).
48 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121(D) (LexisNexis 2010) (noting that
"[i]t is an affirmative defense to any civil, criminal, or professional disciplinary claim
brought under this section that compliance with the requirements of this section was not
possible because an immediate threat of serious risk to the life or physical health of the
minor from the continuation of her pregnancy created an emergency necessitating the
immediate performance or inducement of an abortion."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-4
(2009) (noting that "[w]here there is an emergency requiring immediate action, the re-
quirements of this chapter may be waived.").
* See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-5 (2009) (noting that consent and notice require-
ments are waived when the doctor finds that "a medical emergency exists that so com-
promises the health, safety or well-being of the mother as to require an immediate
abortion"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705()(1)(B) (2002) (declaring that notice is not re-
quired if "an emergency exists that threatens the health, safety or well-being of the minor
as to require an abortion").
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"to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial
and irreversible impairment of major bodily function."s0
B. Descriptions of the Judicial Bypass Process
Statutes describe in detail the process for pursuing the alternative to
notice or consent-the judicial bypass. Most laws make no exceptions for
young women with absent or unavailable parents.' For example, minors
whose parents might consent or receive notice but live apart from the minor
must resort to a bypass if they have no other legal guardian.52 Statutes por-
tray the bypass as a reasonable option for these and all minors by setting out
a process that should be confidential, expeditious, and efficient-the three
requirements of Bellotti.3
In keeping with the first Bellotti criterion, all state statutes require the
bypass process to be confidential. Some statutes detail how courts must pro-
tect minors' anonymity by sealing records, using pseudonyms for petitioners,
or limiting those who may participate in the hearing.5 4 Other states' laws
include general mandates that courts keep proceedings confidential."
Per the second Bellotti criterion, all consent or notice statutes require a
timely process 6-a prompt hearing that will "ensure that the court may
reach a decision promptly and without delay in order to serve the best inter-
est of the pregnant woman."5 7 Depending on the state's law, courts must
50 See, e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(G)(2) (2009 & Supp. 2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(12) (2009) (noting that abortion may be performed if it is
necessary to prevent death); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(c) (2009) (finding that the
consent and notice procedures do not apply if "the attending physician determines that an
abortion is necessary to avert an imminent peril that substantially endangers" the minor's
life).
' But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(b) (West 2000) (stating that "[i]f neither
any parent nor a legal guardian is available to the physician within a reasonable time and
in a reasonable manner, consent of any adult person standing in loco parentis shall be
sufficient").
52 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 37.
5 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
54 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(c) (2002) ("All persons shall be excluded
from hearings . . . except the minor, her attorney and such other persons whose presence
is specifically requested by the applicant or her attorney"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(5)
(2009) (requiring sealed records that will not be opened except for cause; stating that
"[o]nly the pregnant woman, the pregnant woman's guardian ad litem, the pregnant wo-
man's attorney, and a person whose presence is specifically requested by the pregnant
woman . . . may attend the hearing on the petition."); Wis. STAT. § 48.257(a) (2007-08)
(requiring that the petition be titled "In the Interest of Jane Doe, a person under the age of
18").
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114(4)(e) (West 2007) (noting that "[a]ll hear-
ings under this section, including appeals, shall remain confidential and closed to the
public, as provided by court rule."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(5) (2009) (stating that
"all documents . . . shall be sealed by the clerk of the court and shall not be open to any
person except upon order of the court for good cause shown" and that separate sealed
docket will be maintained by the court clerk).
56 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 645.
1 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(f)(1) (West 2000).
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hear or decide petitions within forty-eight hours;"8 seventy-two hours; 9 or
four,60 five,61 or seven business days from the date of filing.62 Some statutes
impose a deadline of twenty-four hours for a judge's ruling.63 Other laws do
not set a deadline for hearing petitions, but require courts to give priority to
bypass petitions," or oblige the state's court administrative body to establish
procedures to expedite bypass petitions and appeals.65
A guarantee of "efficiency" is the third requirement of Bellotti, and it is
perhaps the most difficult requirement to describe.66 Arguably, safeguards
of minors' procedural rights reflect an intent to create a fair alternative to
parental involvement. One-third of statutes direct a court official, counselor,
attorney, or guardian ad litem (GAL) to assist minors in understanding pa-
rental involvement laws and the bypass.67 Moreover, statutes in several
states oblige courts or court administrative agencies to create model peti-
tions, court forms, and other sources of information to help minors." Non-
" See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(E) (2009 & Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 390.01114(4)(b) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-609A(5) (2004 & Supp.
2009); IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-34-2-4(d) (LexisNexis 1993); IoWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(1)
(West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(2)
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(d) (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(h)
(Vernon 2008) (considering petition granted if court has not ruled by 5:00 p.m. on the
second business day).
5 9 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(e) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-113 (2008);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.904(g) (LexisNexis 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
55(3) (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(f)(1) (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
41-32(5) (2002); Wis. STAT. § 48.375(7)(d) (2007-08).
6 See, e.g., COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-107(c)(2) (2010); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.5(3)(a) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010).
61 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1784(c) (1997); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 188.028(2)(2) (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2007);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(b)(iv) (2009).6 2 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(7) (2009).
63 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2F-4(e) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring ruling no
later than the day after hearing).
* See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-804(4) (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12S (West 2002); MINN. STAT. § 144.343(c)(iii) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,§ 1-740.3(D) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-7.1 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
65 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304.5(6)(d) (2008); see also BYPASSING JUSTICE,
supra note 9, at 12.
* See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
67 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(b) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-114(a) (2008);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(3)(b)(West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(2)
(2008); MICH. CoMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.904(a)(ii-iii) (LexisNexis 2005); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.028(2)(1) (West 2004); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-6903(6) (2009); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 90-21.8(b) (2009); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.85(B)(2),
2919.121(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2010), 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(e) (West 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(c)(1-2) (2005).
61 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(2) (2008) (requiring the court to
assist minors in filling out petitions and to create forms with "clear and concise language
which shall provide step-by-step instructions" for completion and filing).
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judicial bodies, such as state or local agencies responsible for children's ser-
vices and welfare, occasionally have a duty to assist minors as well.69
In addition to assistance with understanding the procedural require-
ments associated with consent or notice laws, many statutes give minors the
right to an attorney.70 About the same number of statutes require courts to
appoint a lawyer upon the petitioner's request.' A few laws give courts
discretion to appoint counsel at the minor's request.72 Some statutes permit a
court to appoint a GAL in addition to appointing a lawyer,"7 and others re-
quire a GAL, who in many instances acts as, or in addition to, the minor's
69 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(c)(2) (2005) (requiring department of
children's services to provide "a written brochure or information sheet that summarizes
the provisions and applications of [the statute] and that contains the toll-free telephone
number as well as the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the court advocates in
each judicial district.").
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2-4(b) (2009); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(C)
(2009 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-114(a) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-
609A(3) (2004 & Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4(e) (LexisNexis 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.904(a)(ii) (LexisNexis
2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(2) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(2)(1) (West
2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.85(B)(2), 2919.121(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(e) (West 2000); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(e) (2008); W.
VA. CODE § 16-2F-4(d) (LexisNexis 2006). In addition to access to a court-appointed
lawyer or guardian ad litem (GAL), several states make explicit provisions for the waiver
of court fees for the minor. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(b) (2009) (attorney fees paid
for if "she is unable to pay for the services of an attorney"); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 135L.3(3)(b) (West 2007) (court filing and attorney at no cost for attorney); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6705(b) (2002) (court filing and attorney at no cost); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 722.904(Sec. 4)(2)(e-f) (LexisNexis 2005) (fees at no cost); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-
6905 (2009) (court filing at no cost); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.8(c) (2009) (court
filing and attorney at no cost); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-34 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-10-304(c)(1) (2005) (court filing and attorney at no cost).
7' See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-804(2)(A) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.01114(4)(a) (West 2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(Subd. 6)(c)(ii)(West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(6)
(2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.8(c) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
740.3(C) (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-32(3) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-7.1 (2004 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(c)(1)(2005); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010).
72 See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-107(2)(b) (2010); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-6-118(b)(iii) (2009); UTAH R. Juv. P. RULE 60(c).
7 See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-107(2)(b) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-609A(3) (2004 & Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(3)(b) (West 2007);
MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(Subd.
6)(c)(ii) (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(6) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,§ 1-740.3(C) (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(e) (West 2000); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 34-23A-7.1 (2004 & Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010).
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lawyer.7 4 Rhode Island requires the appointment of a GAL with no mention
of a lawyer.75
C. Standards for Maturity or Best Interests
State parental involvement laws require the same grounds for granting a
bypass petition as established by Bellotti.76 A court must find the minor is
mature (and, as stated in most laws, well-informed) or that an abortion
would be in her best interests.77 Parental involvement laws require courts to
grant petitions if a minor proves either one of these grounds, and, in a num-
ber of states, a petition is deemed granted if the court issues no decision
within a certain timeframe.71 Some statutes set out three grounds for grant-
ing a petition: the minor is mature and well-informed, or parental notifica-
tion would not be in her best interests, or "whether notification may lead to
mental, physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor." 79
Maturity and best interests standards are normally not elaborated with
specificity, thus giving courts ample discretion.s0 Most states require that
the court find the minor to be "mature and well-informed,"' or "mature and
capable of giving informed consent."82 Several states qualify the definition
74 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 722.904(Sec.4)(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2005) (see MICH. CT. R. 3.615(F)-(G),
requiring appointment of an attorney or GAL at minor's request); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.028(2)(1) (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE Am. § 2151.85(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2007);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-32
(3) (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(e) (Vernon 2008).
" R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (2009).
76 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 13; see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651
(1979).
" See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 13; supra note 21 (noting physician bypass
in Maryland, West Virginia, and Maine are exceptions to the use of a court hearing as the
alternative to parental involvement).
7 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(E) (2009 & Supp. 2009); COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-107(f) (2010); DEL. CODE AN. tit. 24, § 1784(c) (1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-114(d) (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. .§ 135L.3(1) (West 2007); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6705(f) (2002); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.85(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2007); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(h) (Vernon
2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010).
* E.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (2008 & Vernon Supp. 2009).
0 See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 19-22 (summarizing state appellate courts'
varying interpretations of maturity and best interests).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1784(b) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1-
114(c)(1) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(d)(1) (2002); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.732(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. AN. § 90-21.8(e)(1) (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-41-33(A)(1) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(e)(1) (2005); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2010); WIs. STAT. § 48.375(b) (2007-08).
82 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(B) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-
804(1)(A)(2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-609A(2)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 135L.3(e)(1) (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 2002);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(Subd. 6)(c)(i) (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(1)
(2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(A) (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206(c) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-7(3) (2004 & Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304.5(5)(b)(i)(A-B) (2008);
186 [Vol. 34
Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance
of maturity by stating that the minor must be "sufficiently" mature and well-
informed," and at least ten states require that the court find such maturity by
clear and convincing evidence.8
Statutes' description of the best interests standard varies even less than
the language about maturity." Some laws include abuse or assault as a
ground for granting a bypass petition or in defining situations where abortion
might be in the minor's best interests."' Where abuse is a ground for grant-
ing a petition, statutes differ in what evidence they require to help substanti-
ate that abuse occurred.87
Few laws describe how a minor, her attorney, or the court should prove
the minor's maturity or best interests. In several states, statutes require
courts to hear evidence "relating to the emotional development, maturity,
intellect, and understanding of the minor; the nature, possible consequences,
and alternatives to the abortion; and any other evidence that the court may
find useful."" Some statutes also require the minor to show-either in her
petition or at the hearing-that she "has been fully informed of the risks and
consequences of the abortion; that she is of sound mind and has sufficient
intellectual capacity to consent to the abortion."89 A handful of states re-
see also North Dakota's consent statute, which empowers the court to "[i]ssue an order
to provide the minor with any necessary information to assist her in her decision if the
minor is mature enough to make the decision but not well informed enough to do so."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(5)(b)(1) (2009).
8 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4 (4)(a) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-
107(2)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114(4)(c) (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.5(B)(3)(b)(ii) (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.904(3)(a) (Lexis-
Nexis 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(2)(a) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.121(3) (LexisNexis 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2008);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(b)(V)(B) (2009).
84 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(C) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-37.5-107(2)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114(4)(c) (West 2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-609A(2)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.5(B)(4) (2008); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(4)(a) (2009); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.85(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(A)
(West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7(3) (2004 & Supp. 2009); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 35-6-118(b)(v)(B) (2009). The clear and convincing evidence standard has been
the subject of recent legislative attention. See infra note 181, 213 (describing bills intro-
duced to change the standard of maturity).
1 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 14.
86 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(d)(4)(b) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114
(4)(d) (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.8(e)(3) (2009); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.85(C)(2) (LexisNexis 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2008).
8 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 16. For example, in Oklahoma, a minor's
physician must report the abuse or assault to local law enforcement or the Department of
Human Services before a bypass hearing. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740.2(C)(2)
(West 2010).
" E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(2)(1) (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-
21.8(d) (2009); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.121(C)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). See also 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(f)(4) (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-32(5) (2002);
Wis. STAT. § 48.375(7)(b)(1) (2007-08).
8 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(2)(1) (West 2004); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.121(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(f)(2)(iv-v) (West
2000); Wis. STAT. § 48.257(e) (2007-08); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-18(b)(v)(B) (2009).
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quire minors seeking a bypass to undergo counseling or receive state materi-
als on abortion (and other subjects) before the court will hear their
petitions.90
In sum, the text of parental involvement statutes might give the impres-
sion of a good-faith effort to balance the interests of minors, their parents,
and the state in abortion decisions. The laws outline an alternative to paren-
tal consultation, allow providers to use reasonable means to establish notice
or consent, and give minors rights to information and assistance. Moreover,
the amount of discretion statutes confer upon judges or physicians might
lead one to believe that there is room to interpret statutes in ways that can
ensure a fair process for young women. As Part II explains, however, on-
the-ground experience with parental involvement laws reveals that, as ap-
plied, notice and consent requirements often present impassable barriers to
abortion services for many pregnant minors.
II. THE GAP BETWEEN LAW AND PRACTICE: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT
LAws APPLIED
In most states, the application of parental involvement laws is anything
but effective, confidential, or timely. Unlike many other research studies in
the area, the National Partnership's project compared what law purports to
do (through an examination of statutes, regulations, case law, statistics, court
forms) and what the law accomplishes in practice (as evidenced by 155 in-
terviews conducted).9' The study represents the views of professionals from
every state with a judicial bypass, including interviews with eighteen judges,
thirty-two lawyers, and fifty-four clinic staff members.9 2 In addition, the
Partnership convened several meetings: a meeting that brought together fifty
judges, advocates, lawyers, and clinicians to share information on how the
bypass functions in various states; a meeting of providers and clinic directors
to reflect on liability issues; and a meeting of judges from across the country
" See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.2 (West 2007) (establishing a program that in-
cludes decision-making video and workbook); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6704 (2002); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(3)(b)(i) (2008 & Supp. 2010) (requiring minors to
"participate in an evaluation and counseling session with a mental health professional
from the Department of Health and Hospitals, office of mental health, or a staff member
from the Department of Social Services, office of community services, or both").
"' But see J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES? THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF TEENS
(2006) [hereinafter WHO DECIDES] (interviewing minors about their experiences seeking
a judicial bypass); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: How COURTS FAIL PREG-
NANT MINORS (2007) (interviewing clerks and intake staff members at courts in Alabama,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee).
92 Each conversation was similarly structured by a series of questions that addressed
topics such as the operation of notice or consent standards, the availability and process
associated with the judicial bypass, and characteristics and experiences of minors seeking
abortions. The study is by no means an exhaustive or comprehensive statement of the
diverse views of professionals working across the country. It is a snapshot of the opera-
tion of parental involvement laws in varying contexts. BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9,
at 23, 29, 34.
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to discuss judicial training.93 Finally, project staff telephoned sixty courts in
three states, inquiring about bypass hearings to test the availability and accu-
racy of information. 94 The study uncovered obstacles to legal and clinical
services that make abortion access for minors, especially through a judicial
bypass, daunting if not impossible.
A. Availability of Reliable Information
A major problem with the operation of parental involvement laws is the
lack of information available to minors, their advocates, and state and local
officials.95 Each person interviewed named her central concern about paren-
tal involvement laws, and the most common response was that minors do not
know that these laws exist.96 If minors are aware of the state's law, they may
not understand how to comply with consent or notice standards or how to
petition for a bypass.97 Even if a minor learns of her options from a hotline,
website, clinic receptionist, or school nurse, the coordination between courts,
clinics, and law offices is often inconsistent and unreliable.98
There are various reasons for this information deficit, several of which
Part III explores further. Pro-choice advocates or providers who would dis-
seminate information about consent or notice laws fear backlash from the
public or public officials who view the judicial bypass as a means of permit-
ting abortions through legal "loopholes."99 Too much publicity, reproduc-
tive rights advocates argue, will put minors' abortions on the radar of state
legislatures, which might restrict access to abortion further.'" It is for this
reason that some lawyers do not claim their fees from the state, and clerks do
not include the expense associated with bypass hearings in court budgets.'0'
Increased attention to consent or notice laws can backfire for clinics as well,
" BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 8-9.
Id. at 9, 44. The template for National Partnership's calls was Helena Silverstein's
book, Girls on the Stand: How Courts Fail Pregnant Minors. SILVERSTEIN, supra note
91, at 39-41.
9 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 49-50.
9 Id. at 49.
9 Another finding of the project was how little information and access to reproduc-
tive health care (or any health care) most minors have generally. A clinician that saw
minors living in non-urban areas of the state described the health care that minors typi-
cally receive in one particular state-prior to seeking an abortion-as "third-world
care." Id. at 39; see also Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 421, 478-483 (2007) (describing the challenges of seeking a bypass or
abortion services for rural youth).
* See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 50.
* See id. at 46 (quoting the comment of one interviewee, it is "'hard to get informa-
tion about the bypass to minors in a politically acceptable way."'); see also Carol Sanger,
Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 443 (2009) (noting also that, in general, abortion is a proce-
dure that most women have discreetly).
" BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 47.
101 Id. at 30, 47.
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which are frequently the targets of litigation. 102 Clinic staff members and
directors interviewed stated that liability concerns "greatly influence their
policies and practices." 0 3
When minors learn that the bypass exists, they will often receive insuf-
ficient or inaccurate information from clinic receptionists, court employees,
school counselors, or other "first contacts."l04 The role of court clerks, for
example, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some locales, clerks go
to great lengths to help explain and facilitate the bypass process for mi-
nors.'10 In many other jurisdictions, clerks are of little assistance.'" Calls to
over sixty courthouses in three states (diverse in their region, population
size, and political culture) revealed that in two of the three states, almost no
one answering the courts' telephones could give accurate information about
the bypass. 07 In addition, the study found that a few clinic receptionists will
describe parental notice or consent, but will not initially explain that the
bypass is an option to minors who call with questions about abortion
services. 0
Like minors, legal or clinical professionals may not have ready access
to information about parental involvement laws.0" Few judges, clerks, clin-
ics, and lawyers receive any training on how the bypass process should work
or what protections the law provides."10 Although bench books sometimes
include materials on conducting bypass hearings, judges often receive no
additional training."' Moreover, it is unclear how effective or willing state-
funded local or community health clinic employees, who counsel pregnant
minors in the course of their jobs, are at helping young women understand
parental involvement requirements.112 In one state, for example, a family-
planning counselor assigned to advise pregnant minors in a state health
clinic did not know that the bypass existed." 3
Other legal or clinical actors are willfully ignorant of their legal obliga-
tions or refuse to assist minors regardless of what the state statute requires." 4
Despite a duty to hear all bypass petitions within five days of filing, one
court would only hear petitions two days a month until lawyers objected and
102 See id. at 36.
103 Id.; cf Roe v. Planned Parenthood of Sw. Ohio Region, 878 N.E.2d 1061, 1069
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (holding that parents could not compel discovery of clinics' records
of minor-patients after petitioner's daughter secured an abortion through a twenty-one-
year-old boyfriend who posed as a parent).
" BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 49.
105 Id. at 43.
0 Id.
107 Id. at 44.
0 1 d. at 38.
" See id. at 54 ("At the state level, what is usually missing is a central source of
information about how to get a bypass and where it can or cannot be obtained.").
no See id. at 24, 33, 42.
"1 Id. at 24.
"
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more hearings were scheduled."' A court in another county was "too busy"
to accept any bypass petitions."' Likewise, although a rare occurrence, a
few clinicians interviewed reported that they vet which minors have a "good
enough" reason for not telling their parents about their pregnancies."' By
determining who is a "deserving" minor, these clinic staff members substi-
tute their judgment about maturity or best interests for the court's and poten-
tially deprive minors of an alternative to which they are legally entitled.
B. Obstacles of Cost and Travel
There are varied logistical impediments to complying with parental in-
volvement laws or petitioning a court for a bypass. Interviewees reported
that obstacles of cost and travel make a bypass feel "impossible" and "in-
surmountable.""' The cost of an abortion can be expensive for women of
any age but may be especially prohibitive for younger adolescents who sel-
dom earn their own income or, in fear of revealing their pregnancy, will not
avail of their parent's health care coverage.'
Other burdens relate to the differences between urban and rural access
to abortion and legal services. Most abortion providers are located in cities
or suburban areas,120 and they refer minors to nearby courts (which typically
have the capacity and will to hear bypass petitions).' 2' As a result, rural
minors travel long distances to reach clinical and court services. A trip (or
trips) of any significant length can be extremely daunting for a young wo-
man who may not have a driver's license, access to a car, or money for travel
and related costs. If travelling from out of state, there is often no way to
follow up with minor-patients about using family planning methods or treat-
ing and preventing sexually transmitted infections (STIs).12 2 In addition, a
minor seeking a bypass might take several unexcused school absences,
which can ultimately lead to expulsion or truancy charges.123 Minors who
are not fluent in English face a different set of hurdles. Courts may not have
" Id. at 50.
"6 Id.
"
7 Id. at 38.
"
8 Id. at 50.
See Abigail English & Carol A. Ford, The HIPAA Privacy Rule and Adolescents:
Legal Questions and Clinical Challenges, 36 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 80, 84
(2004) (stating in regard to confidential health care services, "if the minor has health
insurance coverage and wishes to use it to pay for the care, additional risks exist that
disclosure will take place through the insurance claims process, when explanations of
benefits are sent to the policyholder, usually a parent"); Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion
in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 15 (2008) (estimating the average amount a woman paid for an abor-
tion at ten weeks was $413 in 2006).
120 Jones et al., supra note 119, at 14.
121 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 50.
122 Id. at 39.
123 Id. at 51.
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interpreters on hand to accommodate a non-English bypass hearing or mater-
ials on the state parental-involvement law may only be in English. 12 4
C. Dignity and Delay
Logistical obstacles can create delay, and delay can exacerbate fiscal
and emotional costs. Sometimes delay is imposed directly by judges, who
refuse to hear petitions.'25 Some judges will not participate in the bypass
because of religious objections to abortion or for fear of jeopardizing their
re-election prospects.'26 One attorney described recusals in her courthouse
as "a hot-potato situation," noting that as many as five judges will recuse
themselves before one agrees to hear the petition.' Lawyers can also be in
short supply. Many statutes give minors the right to a lawyer at no cost.'28
However, minors would be hard-pressed to realize this right in many
places.12 9 Lawyers must often take time from busy private or public interest
practices to represent minors whose petitions need immediate attention.'3 0
One interviewee noted, "[s]ometimes we struggle to find an attorney who
will call the minor back right away."'"' Moreover, bypass hearings require a
level of specialization. Not only does a lawyer need to interview the minor
to establish her maturity or best interests, she needs to understand what ques-
tions local judges will want answered.'32
Even when bypass petitions succeed, the current system of parental in-
volvement laws can impose intangible burdens, what Carol Sanger describes
as harm to a minor's "decisional dignity."'33 In the course of bypass hear-
ings, minors must reveal the intimacies of their sexual lives before strangers
1
24 Id.
125 Id. at 24. But see Joyce, supra note 11, at 172 (finding that minors who obtained a
judicial bypass terminated the pregnancy earlier, on average, than minors who obtain
parental consent).
'
26 See Caroline A. Placey, Comment, Of Judicial Bypass Procedures, Moral
Recusal, and Protected Political Speech: Throwing Pregnant Minors Under the Cam-
paign Bus, 56 EMORY L.J. 693, 695, 719-20, 727-28 (2006). Of course, recusals can be a
good thing. Many lawyers interviewed did not want judges "forced" to hear petitions if
they had moral objections or political qualms. See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at
24.
127 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 24.
"' See supra Part I(B).
129 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 53; see also Elizabeth Susan Graybill, Note,
Assisting Minors Seeking Abortions in Judicial Bypass Proceedings: A Guardian ad Li-
tem Is No Substitute for an Attorney, 55 VAND. L. REv. 581, 585 (2002) (arguing that "the
appointment of counsel for minors in civil proceedings is necessary to ensure effective
legal representation and adequate protection of a minor's interests.").
130 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 30.
-' Id. at 33.
1
3 2 See id. at 30-31.
13 Sanger, supra note 99, at 417. See generally Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights:
The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 589, 625 (2001-2002) (describing
Bellotti as purporting to grant rights to minors but only shifting authority from parents to
courts).
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and answer questions about their future plans and family relationships. Re-
lating these details at hearings in a scripted narrative about harm and re-
morse can damage petitioners' sense of self-respect and the legitimacy of the
legal system as a whole.134
Interviewees described the emotional distress that a bypass hearing can
cause, even when the petition is granted and when the judge, clerks, and
others are not overtly hostile to the minor.35 When judges or others are
antagonistic, the process can cause overwhelming anxiety.'36 Several inter-
viewees noted occasions where clerks or judges exhibited "blistering verbal
hostility" toward minors petitioning the court.'3 7 Minors were described as
scared, upset, and embarrassed in hearings that were marked with "secrecy
and shame," trauma, humiliation-"a nightmare."'
D. Extra-Legal Requirements
Despite laws requiring certain courts to accept bypass petitions, in very
few states can minors file a petition in the relevant court of any county or
district.139 Some courts reject petitions by non-resident minors even though
the state statute clearly allows non-residents to petition for a bypass order.140
In two states, the study found, it is unlikely that any court will currently hear
petitions.141
Parental involvement laws also require judges to make independent
evaluations of best interests and maturity, such that if a minor does not meet
one standard, she may meet the other.142 However, some judges conflate
maturity and best interests or will only consider one of the two standards.143
A few judges abuse their discretion by asking inappropriate questions or
making inappropriate demands, practices that have been the subject of na-
tional attention.144 For example, judges have asked petitioners about their
134 Sanger, supra note 99, at 419-20, 444-45, 466.
' BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 27.
'
3 6 See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to
Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 61, 173-74 (2003) [hereinafter Grounded in the Reality].
137 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 26.
'
3 Id. at 27.
139 Id. at 53.
140 Id. at 26.
141 Id. at 53.
1
42 See supra Part I(C).
143 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 29.
'" See Khiara M. Bridges, An Anthropological Meditation on Ex Parte Anony-
mous-A Judicial Bypass Procedure for an Adolescent's Abortion, 94 CAL. L. REV. 215,
225-26 (2006) (noting "subtle corruption of the minor's testimony in the face of the
questions of the court"); Jamin B. Raskin, The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings,
10 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 281, 284 (2002) ("question[s] of [the petitioner's]
relationship to the father of the potential child, whether she has a boyfriend, how she gets
along with her parents, what her social life is like, what her favorite classes are, whether
she has ever used drugs or alcohol, and so on simply have nothing to do with the only
legitimate inquiry, which is: what are the relative medical risks attendant to both the
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sexual habits or relationships in a manner that did not support a maturity or
best interests inquiry.14
Some abortion care providers also require more of minors than the law
does, potentially eviscerating the difference between notice and consent in
practice.146 A number of clinics in notice states reported that they ask all
parents to sign certain forms (sometimes in-person) even though the state
statute only requires the provider to mail a letter of notice to a parent. 47 In
one instance, a clinic required a parent to accompany the minor for the dura-
tion of her appointment because she resided in a neighboring state.148
E. Marginalized Populations: Minors in State or Foster Care
One of the most striking examples of the gap between law and practice
is the predicament of minors whose parents are missing or unavailable. As
noted, most laws do not anticipate this situation.149 Parents may know about
their daughter's pregnancy, but often may be unable or unwilling to take the
steps necessary to notarize consent forms, to appear in person to sign pro-
vider documents, or to accompany minors to their appointments. 's Parents'
failures to comply with provider policies might be based in opposition to
abortion, but it may also relate to a parent's work schedule, immigration
status, or temporary absence due to travel or incarceration. Immigrant-par-
ents, for example, may lack the necessary identification (driver licenses or
birth certificates) to establish parentage."' Parental involvement laws thus
penalize adolescents who would consult their parents, 5 2 but whose parents
abortion procedure and pregnancy and childbirth."); Helena Silverstein & Kathryn
Lundwall Alessi, Religious Establishment in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for
Abortion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 473, 491 n.120 (2004) (describing how judges in Ala-
bama require minors to attend counseling sessions at "Say-A-Life" centers where staff
advise minors to carry their pregnancies to term and practice Christian beliefs).
145 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 25-26.
14 6 Id. at. 35, 37.
147 Id. at 37.
148 Id. The precautions that clinics take to protect themselves from liability are un-
derstandable given the penalties under parental involvement laws. Many laws allow a
provider to rely on a good faith defense in answering the allegation that she failed to use
reasonable means to establish notice or consent. That said, defending any litigation, no
matter the ultimate outcome, is costly and damages the provider's public image. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-117 (2008) ("Immunity of health care provider acting in good
faith"); see also Pammela S. Quinn, Note, Preserving Minors' Rights After Casey: The
"New Battlefield" of Negligence and Strict Liability Statutes, 49 DuKE L.J. 297, 312-13,
320-21 (1999-2000) (noting court decisions striking down strict liability standards as
unconstitutional, and detailing the liability threats to abortion providers and the resulting
chilling effect on their practices).
149 See supra Part I(B).
15o BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 37.
15 Id.
IS2 As has been well documented, the large majority of minors choose to involve their
parents. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors'
Abortion Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196, 200 (1992); Laurie S. Zabin et al., To
Whom Do Inner-City Minors Talk about Their Pregnancies? Adolescents' Communica-
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cannot or will not comply with the requirements established under notice or
consent statutes. To access legal abortion, minors with unavailable parents
must petition a court for a bypass, which, as explained, poses its own set of
challenges.153
Minors who are in state care, who have non-existent or strained rela-
tionships with their parents, acutely feel the weight of consent or notice
laws. More than half a million children in the United States live in foster
care and thirty percent of those are teenagers.15 4 One study found that nearly
one-third of the young women in foster care have been pregnant by the time
they are seventeen.'s According to the same study, by age nineteen, half of
the adolescents in or exiting foster care will have been pregnant.156
Interviews revealed consistent confusion about the standards governing
consent or notice for a minor in state care wanting an abortion.'57 Health
care decisions for minors in the foster care system can depend on broad
distinctions such as whether the health care service is routine or non-rou-
tine.' For abortion, state agencies and foster parents are often unwilling to
provide consent or accept notice for minors in care, even if they have the
authority to do so.'9 Their reasons vary: a state social worker may be biased
against abortion or fear a lawsuit brought by parents whose rights have not
been terminated.'" The common rationale offered by interviewees, how-
ever, was the concern that state employees, whose agencies receive funding
from federal sources, cannot assist minors electing abortion.'6'
tion with Parents and Parent Surrogates, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 148, 148 (1992). More-
over, minors who do not involve parents often seek advice from a trusted adult. Ehrlich,
Grounded in Reality, supra note 136, at 98-100.
15 See supra Part I(B).
154 Lois THIESSEN LOVE ET AL., THE NATL CAMPAIGN To PREVENT TEEN & UNPLAN-
NED PREGNANCY, PREVENTING TEEN PREGNANCY AMONG YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE 1, 6
(2005), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/pubs/Fostering
HopeFINAL.pdf.155 Id. at 7.
156 Id.
117 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 48.
158 See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 3130.91(2)(i), (6) (1999) (giving a state agency the abil-
ity to authorize "routine" treatment, though requiring a minor seeking an abortion to
"comply with applicable law"). Generally, parents or legal guardians have the authority
to consent to routine and non-routine medical care for minors, although in defined in-
stances minors can consent to their own medical care. In many states, a minor may
consent to her own medical treatment in statutorily enumerated circumstances, such as
for contraceptives use, drug and alcohol treatment, treatment for sexually-transmitted in-
fections, and prenatal care. See GuTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, AN OVER-
VIEW OF MINORS' CONSENT LAWS 1-2 (Nov. 1, 2010) (summarizing state statutes
providing "legal ability of minors to consent to a range of sensitive health care ser-
vices-including sexual and reproductive health care, mental health services, and alcohol
and drug abuse treatment"), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spibOMCL.pdf.
' BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 51.
6 Id.
161 Id. at 48. Both federal and state restrictions on funding abortions may be the basis
for this potentially unfounded belief. Regarding federal policy, the Hyde Amendment
(which is an annual rider on the Department of Health and Human Services' budget)
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In Alabama, for example, a person or state agency named in a tempo-
rary custody order may approve some medical treatments for children in
foster or state care.162 Typically, court custody orders authorize the Depart-
ment of Human Resources (DHR) to consent to medical care.163 If the foster
child seeks an abortion, DHR will not consent, and department personnel
will not assist the foster child in obtaining abortion services without court
approval.M DHR's policy became clear through a case challenging the
state's parental consent law, In re Anonymous.165 The petitioner was in
DHR's custody, and neither of her parents was available to consent.166 DHR
argued that it could not give consent because an agency receiving federal
funds could not participate in minors' decisions regarding abortion.'16 The
Alabama Supreme Court did not clarify the issue, stating that it "ex-
pressled] no opinion regarding the duties of a department of the State of
Alabama which has custody of a minor and takes the position that the mere
receiving of Federal funds abrogates its otherwise clear statutory and lawful
duty of protecting the best interest of the minor."' 6
When a minor in a group or foster home seeks an abortion in a state that
requires parental consent, she often has the same two options as a minor who
is not in foster care-she must receive permission from a legal guardian or a
judge. She probably has a tenuous or distant relationship with her parents,
and, if pursuing a bypass, she carries all the same burdens as a minor not in
foster care but is less likely to have the same resources.
The National Partnership's study illustrates that many young women
have access to their legal rights determined by state systems that lack trans-
parency and reliability. In the face of these obstacles, Part III explores how
those opposed to parental involvement laws have pursued reform. These
strategies appear to have had limited success in changing laws or shaping the
attitudes that support them.
prohibits federal spending on abortions services unless the pregnancy is the result of rape
or incest, or the pregnant woman's life is in danger. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (first appropriations rider). States may pay for
or subsidize abortion services using their own funds. See, e.g., Public Funding for
Abortion, AMERICAN CivIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/map.
pdf (map showing which states fund abortion for low-income women voluntarily or be-
cause of a court order). However, states have passed laws like the Hyde Amendment that
restrict state funding for abortion. For example, Texas law states that money spent under
a demonstration project for women's health care services may not be used to perform or
promote elective abortions. TEx. Hum. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.0248(a)(7) (Vernon 2010).
162 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-28.07(5) (Supp. 2003).
163 ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, THE FOSTER PARENT HANDBOOK: A
GUIDE FOR ALABAMA'S FOSTER PARENTS 1, 37 (2001), available at http://www.dhr.state.al.
us/large-docs/fphandbook.pdf.
'" ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-28.07(5)(c) (Supp. 2003).
165n re Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1988).
' Id. at 902.
'
67 Id. at 902 n.1.
16s Id.
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III. LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL REFORM STRATEGIES
Attempts to retrench parental involvement laws typically take three
forms: challenges to laws' constitutionality, state legislative lobbying on the
language of parental involvement statutes, and campaigns to change public
attitudes.6 9 Part III considers how precedent, the larger abortion debate, and
support for parental rights thwart current reform. Moreover, even if one or
all of the three strategies described here were to succeed, it might militate
against a different perspective on adolescent reproductive autonomy.
A. Litigation
Parental involvement laws have been the subject of extensive litiga-
tion,7 0 but for the reasons this section explains, new facial or as-applied
challenges of consent or notice laws may not be prudent."' Although some
facial challenges have resulted in injunctions against parental involvement
laws in federal and state courts (ground that appears to be well tested), 2
cases decided by the Supreme Court suggest that future litigation faces lim-
169 See, e.g., WHO DECIDES, supra note 91, at 160 (recommending policy that enacts
"nondirective" counseling programs and allows non-parent adult involvement); Amanda
M. Lanham, Parental Notification under the Undue Burden Standard: Is a Bypass Mech-
anism Required?, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 551, 582 (2005-06) (arguing for a more rigorous
undue burden standard, based on empirical findings about the effect of notice laws);
Raskin, supra note 144, at 281 (noting that "except for reasons of her health or safety,
there will never be a logical point at which you can veto the abortion decision unless you,
the judge, happen to be ideologically opposed to abortion and are determined to have
your way over her will."); Sanger, supra note 99, at 498 (calling for laws that allow non-
parent adults to consent to abortion); Silverstein & Alessi, supra note 144, at 515-532
(describing potential challenge under the Establishment Clause for courts that refer mi-
nors to Christian organizations for counseling, but lamenting that a minor may be wary of
challenging an Establishment Clause violation in court); Mary Ziegler, Framing Change:
Cause Lawyering, Constitutional Decisions, and Social Change, 94 MARQUETrE L. REV.
(forthcoming Jan. 2011) ("litigation [in the abortion context] sometimes offers move-
ments framing opportunities that might not be available through ordinary politics"). But
see SILVERSTEIN, supra note 91, at 166-172 (noting that challenging parental involvement
laws through appeals of denied petitions has little pragmatic appeal).
170 This section does not address decisions of state appellate courts reversing or af-
firming individuals' bypass petitions because it is concerned with systematic reform.
"' See Pine, supra note 8, at 698-702 (describing the difference between as applied
and facial challenges).
172 See supra note 24 (citing state court decisions enjoining statutes in California,
Illinois, Montana, New Jersey, and Nevada). In several states, legislatures have passed
new parental involvement laws after courts struck down the state consent law. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 390.01114 (West 2007) (effective 2006) (passed after constitutional amend-
ment, section 22, requiring parental notice before abortion); N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Servs. v. Florida, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (striking down Florida's 1999
parental notice statute). And, of course, litigation has not always resulted in injunctions,
but in courts upholding the parental involvement statute. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi,
992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993) (reversing district
court's granting of an injunction of two-parent consent law); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice,
716 So. 2d 645, 660 (Miss. 1998) (upholding two-parent consent law).
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ited prospects of success."' Moreover, taking an as-applied challenge to a
state's law-arguing that the law in practice is unconstitutional-might pro-
duce results that reproductive rights advocates might seek to avoid.17 4
1. Supreme Court Precedent
United States Supreme Court decisions suggest an uncertain future for
litigation on the judicial bypass at the federal level. In the 1990 case, Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, the Court considered the constitutionality of Minnesota's
two-parent notice law."' Lawyers in Hodgson introduced testimony from
judges that the requirements of parental involvement laws were too burden-
some on minors, judges were unequipped to gauge maturity or best interests
for abortion purposes, and the two-parent requirement exacerbated family
strife.' 6 This testimony supported the lower court's decision that two-parent
notification did not further the State's interests in protecting minors and fos-
tering parent-child communication."
A divided Supreme Court disagreed with the district court. Four jus-
tices found the two-parent notification requirement unconstitutional in any
circumstance, although for different reasons than the district court, and four
justices found the law constitutional with or without a judicial bypass."'
Justice O'Connor provided the decisive vote, reasoning that Minnesota's law
was constitutional so long as a judicial bypass was available. 9 The Court's
ruling may have signaled to lawyers that introducing evidence about the by-
pass's effect on minors would have little sway before the Supreme Court. 80
Around the same time as Hodgson, the Court upheld laws that made a
bypass order more difficult for minors to obtain. In Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, the Court affirmed a notice statute that imposed a
heightened burden of proof on the minor.'"' In finding the "clear and con-
" For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding parental involvement
laws, see NAOMI CAHN & JuN CARBONE, RED FAMILIEs v. BLUE FAMILIES 95-100 (2010)
[hereinafter RED FAMILES].
174 Appeals of individual denials of bypass petitions can be risky, too. Some lawyers
reported that they do not appeal denials of bypass petitions, because the minor is either
unwilling to participate or the state appellate court routinely rejects appeals. BYPASSING
JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 19, 32.
175 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) [hereinafter Hodgson III]. For a
summary of facts presented in the Hodgson district court, see Pine, supra note 8, at
679-80.
"'
6 Hodgson 1, 648 F. Supp. 756, 774-75 [hereinafter Hodgson 1], rev'd, 853 F.2d
1452, 1466 (8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Hodgson II].
177 Id. at 778.
17' Hodgson Ill, 497 U.S. at 422, 455, 457-58, 461-62, 479-81, 501.
179 Id. at 461.
' See REPORT ON A MEETING, supra note 13, at 17-18.
'"1 497 U.S. 502, 506-07, 517-18 (1990) (holding that bypass procedure requiring
the minor to show by "clear and convincing evidence" either that she is sufficiently
mature to choose abortion or that an abortion is in her best interests does not violate due
process).
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vincing evidence" standard constitutional, the Court reasoned that requiring
the petitioner to bear the more stringent burden of proof may help ensure
that judges take special care in deciding petitions. 18 2 Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the landmark case in which the Court
reaffirmed Roe v. Wade1 13 but narrowed the scope of the right to abortion for
all women, upheld the constitutionality of a parental consent law (one of
several laws the Court considered).'*
In each of these cases, the Court repeated the Bellotti trope that parental
involvement laws improve parent-minor communication and protect minors'
health and well-being.' Perhaps it is unsurprising that more recent chal-
lenges to parental involvement laws attack the constitutionality of discrete
provisions, such as statutory exceptions for medical emergency. Although
litigation has achieved some success in federal and state courts,186 it may
have limited strategic potential going forward.
In Planned Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit struck down a New Hampshire notice statute
that defined medical emergency without reference to protecting the minor's
health."8 The statute provided for a medical exception to the parental notifi-
cation requirement only when a physician determined that the abortion was
necessary to save the minor's life.' The First Circuit also held that the pro-
vision requiring physicians to certify that abortion was "necessary to prevent
the minor's death" 89 placed physicians in a double bind: they "either . . .
18 2 Id. at 517-18.
183 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'- 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992); see also Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the
Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317,
327 (2006) (showing how Hodgson buttressed the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Casey).
185 Hodgson III, 497 U.S. 417, 445-47 (1990) (summarizing state interest in protect-
ing parental rights); Akron, 497 U.S. at 520 (noting that "the family will strive to give a
lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and mature"); Casey,
505 U.S. at 899 (citing the benefit of "provid[ing] the parent or parents of a pregnant
young woman the opportunity to consult with her in private, and to discuss the conse-
quences of her decision" as support for its decision to uphold parental consent proce-
dures). Around the same time as Akron and Casey, the Supreme Court also heard
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997), which dealt with the meaning of the best
interests standard. The Supreme Court upheld a Montana statute requiring minors to
prove that avoiding parental notification, rather than having an abortion, was in their best
interests. Id. at 297-98.
1"6 See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 585 (Alaska 2007)
(striking down a parental notification law for overly narrow medical emergency excep-
tion in violation of state constitution on the grounds that the act was not the least restric-
tive means of accomplishing the goal of protecting minors); see also Planned Parenthood
of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 935 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down a consent law
because the definition of medical emergency was unconstitutionally narrow).
187 390 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
1" The court held that a judicial bypass hearing was not an appropriate forum for
determining the necessity of health-related abortion because courts were allowed seven
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gamble with their patients' lives in the hopes of complying with the notice
requirement before a minor's death becomes inevitable, or ... risk criminal
and civil liability by providing an abortion without parental notice."19"
Within the notice time period of forty-eight hours, physicians could not, in
most circumstances, determine with certainty that abortion was the only op-
tion available to avert death.19'
In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, a unanimous Su-
preme Court avoided ruling on the constitutional questions raised by
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed.'92 Although the
Court held that the New Hampshire statute as applied may violate the Con-
stitution in some situations,'"9 it remanded the case so that the lower court
could sever any offending provisions.194 The Court determined that in reme-
dying a constitutionally defective statute, courts should look to legislative
intent and void specific provisions rather than enjoin the entire statute. 95
Ayotte is significant not only because it reaffirmed that "[s]tates un-
questionably have the right to require parental involvement,"' 96 but also be-
cause it signaled the Court's unwillingness to strike down an entire statute.197
Moreover, the First Circuit's holding that the New Hampshire law was un-
constitutional because it lacked a health exception predates decisions on
health exceptions in another context. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, the Court up-
held the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act despite the Act's omission of
a health exception that allowed the banned procedure when the woman's
health was in danger.'"9 After Carhart, reproductive rights lawyers might
hesitate to ask the Court to decide the constitutionality of a law that narrowly
defines the health grounds for an abortion performed because of medical
emergency.
'" Id. at 63.
I91 Id.
192 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006).
19 In addition to the ruling on the medical exception requirements, the First Circuit
found the law's protections of the minor-petitioner's confidentiality lacking. Heed, 390
F.3d at 64-65.
'
94 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331-32.95 Id.
'
96 Id. at 326.
1
9 7 Id. at 331-32.
98 550 U.S. 124, 165-67 (2007). The Court held that medical evidence did not con-
clusively establish that an abortion procedure popularly known as partial birth abortion
and clinically described as intact dilation and extraction was necessary (in comparison
with other available procedures) to protect the woman's health. Id. at 162-63, 166-67.
Critics argue that the decision minimizes the opinion of medical experts, who testified to
the safety and health benefits for women, and incorrectly emphasizes the emotional harm
that the abortion procedure at issue in Carhart may cause women. See, e.g., Priscilla J.
Smith, Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves Women's Interests in Motherhood,
17 J.L. & POL'Y 97, 142-44 (2008) ("physical safety and [the] decision not to mother ...
are now pitted against what the Court assumes will be the woman's horror if she comes to
regret her abortion and then finds out how the abortion was performed").
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2. Risks of As-Applied Litigation
As recognized by reproductive rights lawyers, even successful litigation
may have costs.19 9 Challenges to the constitutionality of parental involve-
ment laws as enacted must confront previous decisions. But arguably the
bypass process functions so poorly in some jurisdictions, that very few mi-
nors in some states can petition a court for an order waiving parental consul-
tation. In this situation, a court might find that the implementation of a
consent law is unconstitutional as applied200 if minors in a state do not have a
viable alternative to parental involvement.2 01 Although an unlikely result, if
it occurred, the remedy might be an injunction or negotiated consent decree,
which would specify steps for ensuring that bypass hearings were more
widely available.2 02 But a remedy that potentially forces judges with relig-
ious objections or political qualms to hear petitions could have negative con-
sequences for petitioners.203 Judges in some states (particularly in elected
positions) are under intense pressure from state "Right to Life" committees
to oppose abortion generally and to make a public commitment to deny by-
pass petitions specifically. 204
Judges, as well as court clerks, lawyers, and others, need training and
education, but the infrastructure for it does not currently exist.205 Advocates
might worry that state-created training programs or guidelines for bypass
'9 See REPORT ON A MEETING, supra note 13, at 17.
2" See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1342-1343 (5th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that petitioner's arguments regarding institutional barriers to the law's fair application
held weight; petitioners claimed that courts were "unable to implement the statute in a
constitutional manner" because "most court clerks are either unfamiliar with the bypass
procedures or are completely unaware that a minor could obtain an abortion without her
parents' consent" and "there are insufficient [judges] to hear cases and that court-ap-
pointed counsel will be difficult to obtain.").
201 Sanger describes the damage to the legitimacy of the legal system when minors
cannot find a court that will hear a judicial bypass petition: "[fjorum exclusion tells
[minors] that their claim falls below the requirements of justice and that the problem of
how to gain access to courts is theirs alone to solve." Sanger, supra note 99, at 455.
202 Attorneys may not welcome the prospect of courts, after a successful as-applied
challenge, managing the process of implementing new standards for judicial bypass hear-
ings. Scholarship too substantial to capture here details the advantages and disadvantages
of courts issuing orders that result in court management of complicated public institu-
tions. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Struc-
tural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 45-46 (1979) (summarizing
scholarship critical and supportive of judicial management of systemic reform).
203 Sanger, supra note 99, at 492-96 (describing examples of judges' political and
religious objections to abortion).
20 See id. at 496; see also, id. at 494 (discussing "[t]he official 2006 platform of the
Texas Republican Party, [which] called for the 'electoral defeat of all judges who
through raw judicial activism seek to nullify the Parental Consent Law by wantonly
granting bypasses to minor girls seeking abortion [sic]."').
205 See, e.g., Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, "Honey, I Have No Idea": Court
Readiness to Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REV.
75, 107-08 (2002-03) (describing the widespread lack of preparedness in one state's
courts and the reticence on the part of judges and court staff to deal with bypass
petitions).
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hearings might create additional avenues to courts, but also might reduce the
likelihood of a successful petition. For example, courts, court administrative
bodies, or the state legislature could undertake defining what constitutes ma-
turity or best interests. However, these bodies might draft definitions that
are too narrow or out of step with adolescent experience and cognitive
ability.206
State court decisions that consider the minor's demeanor at a hearing as
part of the maturity analysis illustrate a concern about defining statutory
terms. Some state appellate courts affirm lower courts' decisions in which
the judge relies on the minor's demeanor to assess maturity.207 An Alabama
appellate court affirmed the denial of a petition because "the answers given
by the minor appeared to be [given] in an almost rehearsed manner. There
was not any expression of emotion from either the minor or the godmother
[who] also testified."2 08 An Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
a trial court that assessed the minor's demeanor in analyzing maturity, but
came to the opposite conclusion. The minor displayed too much emotion:
"[c]omplainant's decision to seek an abortion appears to result from panic
rather than well-reasoned and careful decision-making. Even though com-
plainant does well academically in school and has plans to attend college,
she failed to convince this Court that she truly understood the full impact of
having an abortion."20 Guidelines signposting how minors should behave
in a hearing may penalize mature minors who, for whatever reason, do not
(or never will) comport with a judge's expectations.
B. Legislative Amendment or Repeal
An inherent risk of pursuing litigation is that resulting court decisions
may make matters worse. Likewise, appealing to state politicians to repeal
or to amend parental involvement laws is also a complicated endeavor. Only
the New Hampshire legislature repealed its parental involvement law, and
only New Mexico's Attorney General has refused to enforce the state's con-
sent law.2 10 Politicians across party lines appear to believe that parental in-
volvement laws are the best of all worlds-they are "pro-life, pro-choice,
and pro-family all at once." 2 11
206 See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective
Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995)
("[M]ost studies indicate that there are few, if any, differences between the cognitive
processes of adults and adolescents.").
207 See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 21 (summarizing some cases in states
where courts have made demeanor part of the maturity analysis).
208 Ex parte Anonymous, 812 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Ala. 2001) (alteration in original).
2 In re Jane Doe, 749 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
210 Press Release, N.H. Gen. Court, supra note 24; N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-19,
supra note 24 (declaring New Mexico's parental notification law unenforceable because,
among other reasons, the statute does not provide for a bypass procedure).
211 REPORT ON A MEETING, supra note 13, at 2. For a fuller discussion of the politics
underpinning parental involvement laws, see RED FAMiLIEs, supra note 173, at 100-101
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Bipartisan acceptance of parental involvement creates significant barri-
ers to reform in some state legislatures, and pro-choice advocates routinely
lose battles over bills that make consent or notice laws more restrictive. 2 12
For example, recent legislative proposals in Mississippi and Arizona illus-
trate revived interest in the burden of proof standard for maturity. Both bills
required that the minor prove her maturity by clear and convincing evidence
rather than by the preponderance of evidence.213 Proponents of this type of
legislation argue that the current law is "very easy to go around." 2 14
Indeed, putting any aspect of a parental involvement law back on the
legislative agenda may result in bills that make laws more, not less, com-
plex. As noted, most statutes refer to providers' duty to use reasonable
means to verify parental identity, but that duty is often vaguely stated.215
Providers are vigilant in documenting notice and consent, and may impose
requirements beyond what the law demands. 216 Yet recent changes to the
Arizona consent statute demonstrate many legislatures' general suspicion of
abortion providers.217 The revised law preserves the ability of a parent to sue
a provider for failure to secure their consent for up to six years after the
minor's procedure.21 8
Teresa Stanton Collett argues that state legislators' antipathy for abor-
tion providers is well-placed. 2 19 She states that many young women are
pregnant from relationships with substantially older men and that clinics
treat "confidentiality [as] more important than insuring legal intervention to
stop the sexual abuse."2 20 According to Collett, physicians cannot be trusted
(noting that "blue" states identified with Democratic politics pass less restrictive parental
involvement laws, whereas "red" states that typically vote Republican enact more restric-
tive consent laws with fewer exceptions); see also Sanger, supra note 99, at 477 (noting
that progressives have supported parental involvement laws to appeal to the electorate).
212 See Bypassing Justice, supra note 9, at 46.
213 See, e.g., H.B. 2564, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009) (shifting burden to
prove maturity by clear and convincing evidence and directing judges to assess minors'
experience level, perspective, and intellectual ability); S.B. 2391, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2007) (proposing a clear and convincing evidence standard). This is not intended
to discount the success advocates have had in defeating bills in various states that would
make notice or consent laws much more restrictive. See S.B. 1504, 110th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2008) (bill prohibiting a non-resident from petitioning for a bypass); H.B.
2292, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2007) (bill prohibiting clinic staff from assisting minor
with bypass proceedings, as well as increasing reporting duties to the state); S.B. 1059,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008) (bill disallowing a minor from filing in another court
after denial of a petition).
214 John Frank, Bill will make it harder for Florida teens to get an abortion, MiAMi
HERALD, Apr. 14, 2010, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/04/14/1578145/
bill-will-make-it-harder-for-florida.html#ixzz0y3DwiK5 1. The Florida bill introduced
last year elevated the standard of proof, required parents to notarize consent, and created
a longer timeframe for courts hearing petitions. Id.
215 See supra Part II(A).
216 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 35-37.
217 See id. at 46 (describing hostile legislative environment for abortion providers).
218 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(K) (2009 & Supp. 2009).
219 Teresa Stanton Collett, Protecting Our Daughters: The Need for the Vermont Pa-
rental Notification Law, 26 VT. L. REv. 101 (2001-2002).22 0 Id. at 111, 120.
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to give their patients accurate information about the alternatives to and risks
of abortion: "[m]any minors who bypass their parents probably will resort
to an abortion clinic, without being able to distinguish the competent and
ethical from those that are incompetent or unethical." 22 1
Her claims are contested at best and mirror the premises of parental
involvement laws. 222 Many states' statutes, however, are based on beliefs
that young women make poor decisions, and parents, not providers, are in
the best position to protect a minor's health after an abortion.2 2 3 A number of
parental involvement laws mandate providing minors with detailed literature
or counseling on risks or alternatives to abortion. 224 In the same vein, de-
spite extensive medical evidence of abortion's safety,225 some state laws re-
quire providers to disseminate materials that often overstate the risks of
abortion.226
The divisiveness over abortion in the current political environment sup-
ports the belief that stricter laws protect vulnerable minors. Although some
research suggests that the majority of Americans do not support laws that
221 Id. at 112 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979)).
222 See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 36 ("Participants discussed their diligence
in complying with child abuse and assault reporting requirements . . . ."); see, e.g., Jac-
queline E. Darroch et al., Age Difference Between Sexual Partners in the United States,
31 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 160, 166 (1999) (arguing that the proportion of adolescents with
older sexual partners is similar to the percentage of adult women with older partners, and
finding that adolescents with partners three or more years older are more likely to give
birth but less likely to have an abortion than their peers with partners of approximately
the same age).
223 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-301(2), (5) (2005) (legislative findings state
"the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion are serious and can
be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature . . . parents who are aware that their
minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that their daughter receives ade-
quate medical attention after the abortion.").
224 For example, Louisiana's consent statute permits courts to order counseling for the
minor before the bypass hearing to "examin[e] how well the minor interviewed is in-
formed about pregnancy, fetal development, abortion risks and consequences, and abor-
tion alternatives, and . . . endeavor to verify that the minor is seeking an abortion of her
own free will and is not acting under intimidation, threats, abuse, undue pressure, or
extortion by any other persons." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(3)(b)(ii)
(2010); see also Frank, supra note 214 (describing Florida bill "measure to mandate a
judge determine [sic] whether a minor is aware of the 'shortage of unborn babies availa-
ble for adoption"').
225 See Karen Pazol et al., Abortion Surveillance-United States, 2006, 58 SURVEIL-
LANCE SUMMARIES 1, 4 (Nov. 27, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ss5808al.htm?s cid=SS5808ale ("In 2005, the most recent year for which
data were available, seven women were reported to have died as a result of complications
from known legal induced abortions;" in 2005, 820,151 total abortions were performed in
reporting states).
I 6 Chinu6 Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical
Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GuiTrMACHER POL'Y REV.
6, 6 (2006) ("In some cases, the state goes so far as to include information that is patently
inaccurate or incomplete, lending credence to the charge that states' abortion counseling
mandates are sometimes intended less to inform women about the abortion procedure
than to discourage them from seeking abortions altogether.").
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would ban abortion,227 the extent to which anti-abortion sentiment shapes
legislative agendas is incontrovertible. 228 Since Roe v. Wade, states have
steadily restricted access to abortion through laws that dictate how and when
women may access abortion services.229 Parental involvement laws reflect
broader state activity in restricting abortion and implicate the equally contro-
versial issue of young women's readiness for sexual activity.23 0
At the heart of the debate is whether abortion and sex among teenagers
result in emotional harm or negative outcomes in school or other areas.23 '
Consent and notice laws purport to protect minors from risky sexual behav-
ior or rash decisions about pregnancy by making them confront parents with
the fact of their pregnancy. 23 2
The premise that parents are best suited to monitor adolescent decisions
about sex features prominently in the legal system. In the recent past, poli-
cies actively and publicly punished teenage pregnancy and sexuality through
school expulsions, maternity homes, and criminal penalties. 233 It was not
until the 1970s that most teens could make independent decisions about birth
227 See Poll, THE NEW YORK TIMES/CBS NEWS (Sept. 12-16, 2008), available at http:/
/www.rhrealitycheck.org/emailphotos/pdf/NYTCBS AbortionPOLL.pdf (37% of poll
respondents believe "[a]bortion should be generally available to those who want it" and
42% answered that "[abortion should be available but under stricter limits than it is
now;" only 19% thought abortion should not be permitted).
228 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 377 (2007) (describing backlash to Roe).
229 For a summary of laws that restrict abortion access, see CENTER FOR REPRODUC-
TIVE RIGrHTs, Roe v. Wade in the States 1, 1-3 (2007), available at http://reproductive
rights.org/en/document/overview-of-types-of-abortion-restrictions-in-the-states.
230 For example, note the legislative intent of Wisconsin's parental consent law:
"[t]he medical, emotional and psychological consequences of abortion and of childbirth
are serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature. The capacity to
become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of bearing
a child or of having an abortion are not necessarily related." Wis. STAT. § 48.375 (2-3)
(2007-08).
231 See Jocelyn T. Warren et al., Do Depression and Low Self-Esteem Follow Abor-
tion Among Adolescents? Evidence from a National Study, 42 PERSP. SEXUAL REPROD.
HEALTH 230, 233 (2010) (showing no association with depression or low self-esteem and
abortion for adolescents); see also Guggenheim, supra note 133, at 625-26 (setting out
the reasoning of Bellotti regarding the rights of parents, the assumed immaturity of mi-
nors, and the limitations imposed on the parent who potentially acts arbitrarily); Bill
McCarthy & Eric Grodsky, Sex and School: Adolescent Sexual Intercourse and Educa-
tion 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that sexually active mi-
nors in romantic relationships do not necessarily exhibit greater social or behavioral
problems than those minors who are abstinent).
232 Indeed, the justification repeated in the legislative intent of parental involvement
laws is that they foster parent-child communication, which is in the best interests of the
minor. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-1 (2009) ("parental consultation is usually desirable
and in the best interests of the minor"); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-602(2)(d) (2004) ("pro-
viding a pregnant minor with the advice and support of a parent during a decisional
period"); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-1 (LexisNexis 2006) ("parental consultation regarding
abortion is usually desirable and in the best interest of the minor").
233 Sanger, supra note 99, at 476.
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control, much less abortion, without parental approval.23 4 Consent or notice
laws may appear aberrant in light of a longer history of the previous harsh
public sanctions of extramarital teen sex.
Thus, it may not be surprising that many consider minors who avoid
parental involvement (through a bypass hearing or other means) suspect.235
Even though most minors consult their parents about abortion on their ac-
cord,23 6 the long-standing deference to parents in law may make any circum-
vention of parental involvement feel counter-intuitive to many. Parental
autonomy has been described as having the veneer of natural law-it is
older than the Constitution,237 and is part of the "parents' natural inclinations
to care for their children, especially when children reside with their parents
and their family relationship is normal." 238 Rights of parents to control "the
home" are at the core of traditional notions about how adult citizens limit
the intrusion of government in a constitutional democracy23 9 and protect their
children's future ability to exercise their rights.240
The legal system affirms parents' supervision and control of children in
most areas, right up to the age of majority. 241 Adolescence can be invisible
234 RED FAMILIES, supra note 173, at 83 (noting that until 1977 all states required
parental consent for contraceptive use).
235 Naomi Cahn and June Carbone note the religious foundations of this attitude:
premarital sex is a sin, and those adolescents that engage in sex should bear the conse-
quences of that choice. RED FAMILIES, supra note 173, at 96. Sanger also describes
minors seeking a bypass being cast as those "sneak[ing] around the very wages of sin."
Sanger, supra note 99, at 464.
236 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
237 Guggenheim, supra note 133, at 603. Privileging parental rights in American con-
stitutional law and tradition has also engendered criticism. See Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human
Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONsr. L. 1, 29 (1999) (arguing that the
reification of parental autonomy cuts against the recognition of children's rights, which
"challeng[e] American history and tradition but [are] rooted in broad concepts like lib-
erty, equality, and especially dignity").
218 See Richard Storrow & Sandra Martinez, "Special Weight" for Best Interests Mi-
nors in the New Era of Parental Autonomy, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 789, 805 (2003).
239 See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv.
955, 985-86 (1992-93).
240 Id. at 990-91. The democratic rationale for protecting parents' rights is at the
heart of Bellotti, which describes the family as the "the institution by which 'we inculcate
and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural"' Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04
(1977)). The conception of the private family that thwarts government control and in-
stills democratic values in the next generation has been the subject of varied and exten-
sive critique. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18
MICH. J. L. REFORM 835, 835-36 (1985) (arguing that by virtue of passing and imple-
menting laws that define and affect the family, the state is always part of the mythical
"private family").
" Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv.
547, 559-60 (2000-2001). The Supreme Court case, Troxel v. Granville, brought con-
temporary meaning to the traditional assertions of parents' rights. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
In a plurality decision, the Court held that granting visitation to a child's grandparents
over a parent's wishes violated that parent's substantive due process rights of "care, cus-
tody, and control" of her child. Id. at 72. Troxel may not apply to areas where the Court
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in the law, because regardless of whether someone is sixteen or six, many of
the same restrictions and protections apply.2 42 Moreover, the contemporary
rights that parents exercise for their children are many-the right to direct or
control religious training, wages and finances, consent to marriage and legal
decision-making, and choices in education. 243 With notable common law
and statutory exceptions, parents exercise authority over their children's
medical care.244
Because abortion is one of the few exceptions to the control that parents
exert, consent and notice laws reflect reasoning that justifies their "excep-
tional" status. Parental authority should be restricted if it serves an impor-
tant social purpose (preventing unwanted motherhood for teenagers), or if
there is a likelihood that parents might not act in accord with minors' best
interests.2 45 Both propositions are contested, and fuel the larger debate over
parental involvement laws. Martin Guggenheim notes that most modern
statutory exemptions to parental consultation in minors' health care deci-
sions-such as STI testing-create "sensible public health rules." 246 Legis-
lating for abortion seems to afford no such sensibility: "[f]or better or
worse, it simply is not currently possible in the United States to rely on the
political process to satisfactorily resolve the deeply contentious abortion
issue." 247
Attempts to change parental involvement laws invariably become em-
broiled in debates about safeguarding parental interests and the legitimacy of
permitting minors to avoid parental consultation in their reproductive
choices. The next section describes how reproductive rights advocates have
tried to change the public conversation, but may not have challenged core
beliefs supporting parental rights.
C. Public Opinion Appeals
In response to these political and legal hurdles to reform, some national
and state-based groups have pursued publicity campaigns in hopes of shift-
has set out competing constitutional rights of minors, but it illustrates the deep deference
and "special weight" accorded to parents in making decisions for their children. Id. at
69.
242 Scott, supra note 241, at 555-56.
243 See Guggenheim, supra note 133, at 638-39 (describing how children are not
treated by laws "as autonomous agents empowered to make significant decisions in their
lives.").
24 Storrow & Martinez, supra note 238, at 794. The "mature minor doctrine" is a
common law rule that permits mature adolescents to give consent for medical care. Not
all state courts recognize the doctrine. See Scott, supra note 241, at 567-68. See gener-
ally Garry Sigman & Carolyn O'Connor, Exploration for Physicians of the Mature Minor
Doctrine, 119 J. PEDIATRIcs 520 (1991) (using court vignettes to describe the modem
reception of the mature minor doctrine).
245 See Scott, supra note 241, at 569-76.
24 Guggenheim, supra note 133, at 642.
247 Id. at 643.
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ing attitudes about adolescent sexuality and abortion. 248 Gaining little
ground using rhetoric that promotes adolescents' rights, opponents of paren-
tal involvement laws rely on images of the "bad parent" who is unfit to
exercise her authority.2 49
This message has been somewhat successful. A recent example was the
fight over the California ballot initiative (Proposition 4) that would have
amended the state constitution to require parental notice forty-eight hours
before a minor's abortion.250 Pro-choice advocates conducted extensive pub-
lic attitude surveys and aired commercials intended to garner sympathy for
minors who cannot, because of abuse or family economic instability, tell
their parents they are pregnant. 251 They depicted the consequences for mi-
nors as dire-teens forced to alert parents to their pregnancies will resort to
illegal terminations or worse.25 2 This message is commonly repeated: telling
parents about pregnancy and abortion choices risks harm to a minor by "ex-
acerbat[ing] already volatile intrafamily dynamics and place the minor in
danger." 253 The response of those in favor of parental involvement is also
predictable: consent or notice statutes do not hurt minors; "child predators"
do.254 Although the proposition failed, the message of the opposition's cam-
paign implicitly affirms the perception that adolescents without abusive or
absent parents should not need to bypass parental consultation.
The same messages surfaced recently in the debate over the Alaska's
2010 ballot measure, although with less success. Mirroring the Proposition
4 campaign, opponents of the proposed parental notice law sponsored ads
that featured the voice of an adult commenting that her daughter would ask
248 See, e.g., Resources: Minors' Access Cards, PHYSICIANS FOR REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE AND HEALTH, http://www.prch.org/resources-minors-access-cards (last visited
Oct. 30, 2010) (summarizing laws on the provision of reproductive health services to
minors in thirteen states).
2 See REPORT ON A MEETING, supra note 13, at 4 ("publicity campaigns asking
viewers to empathize with teens who lack parental support have helped to defeat parental
involvement bills").
250 Propositions on parental notice have failed to pass twice before-Proposition 85
in 2006 and Proposition 73 in 2005. See Proposition 85, Official Title and Summary,
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/proposition_85/enti
re-prop85.pdf; Proposition 73, Official Title and Summary, available at http://vote2005.
sos.ca.gov/voterguide/prop73/title-summary.shtml. See Waiting Period and Parental
Notification, HEALTHVOTE.ORG, http://www.healthvote.org/index.php/site/prop-home/
C36/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (reporting voting outcome for Proposition 85); Parental
Notification, HEALTHVOTE.ORG, http://www.healthvote.org/index.php/site/prop-home/
C31/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (reporting voting outcome for Proposition 73). If Pro-
position 4 had passed, advocates were prepared to challenge the law under the state's
constitution. See Proposition 4, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA EDUCATION
FUND, http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/prop/4/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
25' See Teen Safety, PLANNED PARENTHOOD AFFILIATES OF CALIFORNIA ACTION FUNDS,
http://www.ppactionca.org/issues/teen-safety.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
252 Id.
m Storrow & Martinez, supra note 238, at 802.
34 See YES on 4/Child and Teen Safety and Stop Predator Act: Sarah's Law, http://
www.YESon4.net (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
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for advice if she were pregnant, but that other girls are not as fortunate. 255
The speaker's message is that only for the minority of families is parental
involvement inappropriate or objectionable. Public opinion campaigns,
whether they support or reject parental involvement, rely on messaging that
supports the rights of "fit" parents. For example, proponents of the Alaskan
ballot initiative equated notice of abortion to all other areas of parental con-
trol: "[w]e take it for granted that parents are required to give their consent,
or at least be notified, before their child can get an aspirin at school, have her
ears pierced, get a tattoo, go to an R-rated movie, or attend a field trip."256
Opponents also appealed to parental control of the home: "[E]lection Day is
tomorrow! It's time to show that we won't stand for the government and
bureaucrats in our living rooms."2 57
These publicity campaigns, however, do not necessarily challenge the
attitudes that make parental control over minors' pregnancy decisions so
popular-that "good" parents should be able to guide the reproductive deci-
sions of their daughters. The top-down approaches of litigation, legislation,
and public campaigns do not reach the nuanced and entrenched beliefs about
parents, their daughters, and procreative decisions that operate at multiple
levels of political and cultural experience.
A public education campaign comes closest to a reform strategy that
could help shape the attitudes of those that work directly with minors. How-
ever, those interviewed by the National Partnership did not recommend any
of the three strategies discussed in this Part as ways to move the debate past
the current standstill. For this reason, the study did not advocate repeal or
revision of state statutes. It did not argue for a litigation strategy to expose
the constitutional deficiencies of parental involvement laws or purport to be
a tool for those who might lobby state lawmakers. Instead, it incorporated
the comments of interviewees who spoke about the need for tailored reform
that might influence what state actors believe they can do. Their recommen-
dations include disseminating information, fostering dialogue among local
professionals, and creating an infrastructure for legal and clinical services
that is responsive to the needs of a particular jurisdiction.
IV. REFORM IN UNCERTAIN LEGAL SPACES
Parts I and II described the difficulties with the law and its implementa-
tion, and Part III demonstrated why common strategies for reform may not
change the underlying norms that make consent and notice laws so popular.
255 VoteNOon2AK, No on Ballot Measure 2 TV Ad, YouTUBE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVIlliz7Fmw.
256 Alaskans for Parental Rights Yes on 2, http://www.alaskansforparentalrights.org/
about-2. (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
257 Alaskans Against Government Mandates: Protect our Teens and Families,
FACEBOOK (Aug. 23, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://www.facebook.com/NOon2AK?v= info&
ref=TS#!/NOon2AK?.
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For those who believe parental involvement laws are misguided, the remain-
ing objective of this Article is to suggest a way forward in solving a compli-
cated set of problems. This Part draws from the recommendations of those
interviewed by the National Partnership because the collaborative, flexible,
and information-driven strategies they describe resonate with an interesting
area of legal thought-new governance. New governance theory applied to
parental involvement laws might justify reform on new terms and foster a
conversation about the risks of a collaborative approach.
A. New Governance Briefly Defined
The National Partnership's critique of parental involvement laws fits
squarely within a legal realist account of the gap between the text of consent
or notice statutes and the lived experience of law.258 Unlike the Legal Real-
ism movement that motivated Law and Society thinkers several decades
ago,259 contemporary legal realist scholarship is less concerned with the sci-
entific study of how law might more closely resemble practice260 and is more
interested in how policy should reflect the modem complexities of govern-
ance.2 6 1 A "new" legal realism is less legocentric: it draws from the skepti-
cism expressed in post-modernism and Critical Legal Studies about formal
law's power to change institutional or individual behavior.2 62 Part of this
skepticism is the result of frustrations with regulation on opposite ends of a
spectrum of state control. On one hand, many criticize the centralized gov-
ernance emblematic of New Deal agencies for creating paralyzing bureau-
cracy that blocks contextualized innovation.2 63 On the other hand, devolving
power to corporate entities, whose market position may drive decisions
about the delivery of services, cedes public management to private bodies
that are not subject to democratic checks. 264
New governance 265 is a response to the failings of regulation by the top-
down, powerful state and privatization-a "long-awaited synthesis" and
258 See Arthur McEvoy, A New Realism for Legal Studies, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 433,
443 ("bring[ing] facts to bear on the management of social life" and "mak[ing] experi-
ence legally meaningful"); see also id. at 448-49 (listing areas where new realism has
been applied).
259 Id. at 443.
260 Id at 441.
261 See generally Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Real-
ism?, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 335 (2005) (summarizing a set of papers contributed to a sympo-
sium issue of the Wisconsin Law Review on approaches to New Legal Realism).
262 McEvoy, supra note 258, at 443-48.
263 See, e.g., Charles Sabel, A Quiet Revolution of Democratic Governance: Towards
Democratic Experimentalism, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, in GOVERNANCE IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY 121, 138 (2001) (describing the problems
with centralized regulation in the context of school reform).
264 McEvoy, supra note 258, at 445-46.
265 "New governance" is only one way to describe the method I explain here. See
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MiNN. L. REv. 342, 346-47 (2004-2005) [hereinafter
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"third way between regulation and market solutions." 266 It is an approach
that "seeks to reinvent governance from the 'bottom up' by rejecting ancient
administrative strategies of command and control and replacing them with a
continuous dynamic process governed by the relevant stakeholders." 26 7 The
type of policy that new governance supports is thus distinct from rules that
confer legal rights and remedies or penalize certain behaviors or actions.2 68
Instead, new governance encourages legal intervention based on self-moni-
toring, participation, and information sharing.2 69 Ideally, stakeholders-or
public and private bodies interested in a policy working more effectively-
collaborate to reach shared decisions about reform and the distribution of
power and resources.2 70 Although new governance emphasizes processes
shaped outside of courts or legislatures,271 it also resists complete privatiza-
tion. 272 The envisioned responsibility of courts and public bodies is to en-
Renew Deal] (listing the various names and terms that describe new governance think-
ing: "This Article demonstrates how the governance model emerges from a myriad of
recent scholarly theories including the following: "reflexive law," "soft law," "collabo-
rative governance," "democratic experimentalism," "responsive regulation," "outsourc-
ing regulation," "reconstitutive law," "post-regulatory law," "revitalizing regulation,"
"regulatory pluralism," "decentering regulation," "meta-regulation," "contractarian
law," 'communicative governance," "negotiated governance," "destabilization rights,"
"cooperative implementation," "interactive compliance," "public laboratories," "deep-
ened democracy and empowered participatory governance," "pragmatic lawyering,"
"nonrival partnership") (citations omitted).
2
" Orly Lobel, Formulating a New Paradigm: Newness and the Ripeness of the Mo-
ment, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 492, 492 [hereinafter Formulating a New Paradigm]; Renew
Deal, supra note 265, at 343.
267 Erlanger et al., supra note 261, at 357. For foundational work in new governance,
see generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIvE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992) ("Good policy analysis is not about choosing be-
tween the free market and government regulation . . . sound policy analysis is about
understanding private regulation . .. and how it is interdependent with state regulation");
Michael C. Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (identifying a new form of decentralized governance that
depends on shared local knowledge of private and public actors); Michael C. Dorf, Legal
Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 882 (2003) ("the way
past the current impasse is to return to [a] commitment to a legal decisionmaking process
that is deeply informed about the institutions with which legal actors interact . . . ."). For
new governance strategies applied, see Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law
in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 139 (2006) (noting how new governance
ideas animate specific health care reform proposals).
268 See Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 348, 371-404 (describing how new govern-
ance challenges "conventional assumptions" of administrative laws).
26 Trubek, supra note 267, at 139.
270 See Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of
Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005
Wis. L. REv. 498, 500 (depicting actors in a new governance process as "consensual,
deliberative, on-going").
271 See Grdinne De Bdrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 228 (2008) (explaining that new governance in the transnational con-
text is characterized by increased participation of non-state actors and embeds additional
sites of political and legal intervention).
272 See Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 389 ("At its best, however, the governance
model assumes a harder definition of soft law; one that preserves an active role for the
state and the legal regime.").
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force benchmarks of "effectiveness, efficiency, and equity."2 73 Law remains
important as a "catalyst" that sets into motion voluntary and compliance-
based programs, and vets problems that arise if self-monitored systems
fail. 274
The appeal of new governance is its potential to offer an alternative
process for issues where discretion characterizes the implementation of law
and litigation and statutory revision has had limited success. 7s Although
originally applied in administrative and regulatory settings, new governance
has influenced "an array of substantive domains, including employment, oc-
cupational safety, environmental regulation, community policing, education,
corporate governance, community lawyering, anti-discrimination, constitu-
tionalism, and healthcare."2 76 The goal of reconfiguring all aspects of public
institutions (from their management to their culture) resonates with those
frustrated by the lack of response by public bodies or private entities after
winning rights for marginalized populations in court or in statutes. 277
For example, new governance ideas have some traction in efforts to
reduce gender bias in the workplace.2 78 Traditionally, statutes punish indi-
viduals that discriminate against women and employers that are complicit in
discrimination (such as creating a hostile work environment); courts enforce
anti-discrimination laws through the adversarial process. 279 However, sys-
temic gender discrimination can be difficult to prove, especially because
gender bias usually exists on the levels of institutional culture, interpersonal
interactions, or the discretion of lower or mid-level managers that shape how
women are treated.280 Court intervention can entrench exclusionary attitudes
or practices because it incentivizes employers to ignore or hide evidence of
unfair treatment to avoid the costs of litigation.28'
273 Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1647 (2001).
274 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 521-22 (2001) [hereinafter Second Generation Em-
ployment Discrimination].
275 NeJaime, supra note 17, at 324, 339; cf Guggenheim, supra note 133, at 633-34
(describing how the maturity and best interests standards afford judges wide discretion).
276 NeJaime, supra note 17, at 338-39.
277 See id. at 324-25 (arguing that new governance offers cause lawyers an alterna-
tive to a rights critique).
27 8 See, e.g., Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 274, at
522-25 (applying a structural, collaborative model to solving the problems associated
with discrimination in the workplace); see also Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclu-
sion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 247,
251 (2006) [hereinafter Architecture of Inclusion] (arguing that "innovative public initi-
ative" helped "increase the participation of women in academic science").
" Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 274, at 475-76.2 80 Id. at 460-61.
281 Id. at 467, 522 (arguing that legal systems will bend to court intervention but not
necessarily in productive ways; court intervention can "trigger strong resentment and
resistance, and [it invites] strategic behavior aimed at minimizing the impact of the
law").
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Constructing an approach that relies on stakeholder participation rather
than courts, Susan Sturm argues that the internal policies of employers, sup-
ported by non-profit organizations and government resources, can better re-
spond to gender bias.28 2 She details the "women's initiative" of a major
company, created through the leadership of high-level management who rec-
ognized that the turnover of women employees was draining the corpora-
tion's talent pool.283 An internal task force partnered with a non-profit
organization committed to workplace fairness to study why women left the
company. 284 The task force found that work-life balance, a male-dominated
culture, and a lack of women in leadership positions created obstacles to
women's career advancement. 285 The company responded by creating a re-
tention program administered by line managers in regional offices that insti-
tuted transparent processes for work assignments and created benchmarks
for implementation, the realization of which affected the promotion opportu-
nities of upper management.286 This approach appears to have achieved the
goal of retaining more women employees.2 8 7
Interestingly, the National Partnership's findings about how people im-
prove the local implementation of consent and notice laws reflect new gov-
ernance ideas.2 88 The next section explores how the collaboration among
clinical and legal professionals in some states involves practices that are
central to new governance projects.
B. The New Governance Aspects of Interviewees' Recommendations
One goal of the National Partnership's project was to understand what
makes the difference in places where gatekeepers to clinical and legal ser-
vices decide to assist minors in the bypass process.28 9 As this section de-
scribes, the processes in these places share some common characteristics. 290
Professionals in different practice settings form relationships in order to de-
velop and disseminate reliable information for minors and for each other.
These professionals-clerks, lawyers, judges, advocates, or clinic staff-
adopt practices that minimize the logistical barriers to securing consent or
notice or to filing a petition for a bypass. As a result, the parental involve-
ment system acquires a professionalism that can help ensure bypass hearings
are timely, confidential, and humane. Because laws differ from state to
282 See Salamon, supra note 273, at 1639 (arguing new governance promotes public
officials in the role of the "good inspector").
283 Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 274, at 492-93.284 Id. at 493.
285 Id. at 494.
286 Id. at 495-96.
281 Id. at 498-99.
288 See Salamon, supra note 273, at 1620 (describing the importance of "implementa-
tion studies" in revealing the problems with public programs).
289 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 6.29 0 Id. at 53-57.
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state, the practices that accomplish these ends respond to the context of the
jurisdiction.
These problem-solving methods mirror key features of the reform
called for by new governance scholars: collaboration among stakeholders,
information collection and distribution, private-public relationships, and
context and flexibility in design.29'
First, recommendations reported by the National Partnership emphasize
the need for collaboration among stakeholders.2 92 The bypass functions rea-
sonably well in jurisdictions where agreements between judges, state offi-
cials, clinics, and lawyers inform the delivery of services. For example, a
lawyer can broker friendships in the local court, which make filing and judge
selection easier, or a clinic might work consistently with court clerks and
social services so that trust is established.293 Proponents of new governance
argue that building relationships can "defuse adversarial interactions."2 94
Another benefit of collaboration (and similarity of new governance) is
the creation of networks with "fluid and permeable boundaries between pri-
vate and public" forums.2 95 For example, some jurisdictions consolidate in-
formation about legal and clinical processes on websites or through hotlines
for minors2 96 and for those that a minor may contact first for assistance, like
clinicians, social workers, staff members of community clinics, and school
personnel.2 97 Often the most helpful information captures the nuances of
how the system works-for example, which judge is willing to hear peti-
tions or what types of assistance various abortion providers offer a minor.
This communication is often not for public consumption. Interviewees
spoke about the need to have confidential and tightly controlled networks of
knowledge. 99 Judges expressed concern that too much publicity around the
bypass's existence will scare away judges otherwise willing to hear peti-
tions.2" As one judge stated, "If we begin training and calling attention to
the fact that we have a bypass process, and most people don't know that we
have it in the first place, there may be a groundswell of activity against it-a
grassroots sort of thing that blames judges for the bypass existing and makes
hearings harder to conduct."30 Likewise, in some locales, counselors at
291 See Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 371-404 (listing the characteristics of new
governance).
292 See id. at 377 (stakeholders become "involved in the process of developing the
norms of behavior and changing them ... a shared problem-solving process rather than
an ordering activity.").
293 See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 54-55 (describing how professionals
might coordinate resources in a state).
294 NeJaime, supra note 17, at 332; Trubek, supra note 267, at 139.
295 Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 374.
26 BYPASSING JUsTICE, supra note 9, at 55.
297 Some health care providers, for example, reported that minors are likely to tell a
school official first about their pregnancies. Id. at 47.
298 See id.
29 See id. at 28.3m Id.
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state health departments or state-funded family planning clinics work "be-
hind the scenes" by providing information and helping minors navigate the
bypass system.301 Their conduct might change were their actions reported
widely, especially if their colleagues believe that state policies on abortions
limit the help they can provide pregnant minors.3 02
Perhaps the most effective strategy to assembling sensitive information
is the approach of a clinic in one jurisdiction where the bypass is a viable
option. The largest abortion provider in the state gathers contact information
for courts, attorneys, and social workers; creates county-by-county files with
relevant court documents and instructions; and consistently updates informa-
tion through a well-developed network of contacts.3 03 In addition to organiz-
ing information, the clinic is able to provide information about the state's
law to those they contact.304
Centralized resources-public or confidential-require a manager that
need not always be the state's major provider. Non-profit organizations ad-
vocating on behalf of women or providers that do public policy work can
also take up the task of coordinating information.3 05 Lawyers may also play
a crucial role. In some counties, volunteer attorneys take part by not only
representing minors but also developing materials, such as model orders or
petitions.3 06 Good relationships between health care and legal professionals
or advocacy organizations and state agencies enable those assisting minors
to rely on such materials.
Building relationships suggests another new governance element: pri-
vate and public relationships can help create workable processes for minors.
Parental involvement laws depend on state institutions because the alterna-
tive to notice or consent of a parent is usually a court.3 07 Moreover, clinics
and other health care providers, even when minors do not elect to pursue .a
bypass, operate under intense state regulation and scrutiny.3 08 Private clinics
and members of civil society have no choice but to engage with state actors.
Thus, the relationships among state and non-state actors can make the differ-
ence between a smooth or cumbersome process. For example, some court
clerks are minors' best advocates: they manage judges' schedules to accom-
modate bypass hearings, help prepare the minor for court, and assist attor-
neys and their clients with court paperwork.3 1 A few court administrative
301 Id. at 48.
302 See supra note 161 (citing Texas policy restricting state funding for anyone per-
forming or promoting abortion services).
303 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 41.
* Interview with Clinic Director (Sept. 5, 2008).
305 See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 56.
306 Id. at 29.
307 See supra Part I(A).
30s See supra Part III(B) (describing legislative attention directed at providers).
9 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 43.
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offices take the lead in preparing and circulating instructions to court staff
about bypass procedures.3 10
This level of collaboration depends on sharing a common purpose of
facilitating access to clinical and legal services for minors who want to ter-
minate pregnancies, which can be difficult for the reasons outlined in the
next section. However, evidence of how the law can harm young women in
one's own city or county may bridge ideological gaps."' A few interviewees
described working with lawyers and clerks who initially saw themselves as
"outsiders" but nonetheless agreed to collaborate with those already assist-
ing minors seeking a bypass-the "insiders."312 After working with minors
directly, they became reform-minded. One interviewee-lawyer with strongly
held religious beliefs volunteered to represent minors reluctantly at first.313
After getting to know the adolescents seeking her representation, she saw
her role as providing valuable advocacy for young women who believe abor-
tion is their best option.3 14
Others participating in bypass hearings (judges, lawyers, clerks) ex-
press a desire to protect the fidelity of law by ensuring that minors can exer-
cise their legal rights. For example, several of the court clerks interviewed
did not support abortion rights, but they went to great lengths to secure the
confidentiality of files and the anonymity of the petitioner."' Likewise, one
judge intervened when she learned of a colleague treating petitioners poorly
because the conduct did not befit a member of the judiciary.3 16
Reform based on collaboration presumes a certain amount of flexibility.
Participants in state bypass processes change-attorneys leave practice, old
clinics close and new clinics open, judges or clerks retire.317 The provisions
of a statute may stay consistent, but how the law is practiced evolves over
time. Rather than impose rules about how decisions are made, new govern-
ance may suggest a policy that allows "a range of interpretation, deviance,
and trial and error."318 However, information about how the law is practiced
is difficult to gather and to maintain. 19 After consolidating various sources
of knowledge about how the law works, participants have to monitor, evalu-
ate, and disseminate data about the practice of law as the system changes. 32 0
3 10 Id. at 42.
31" See supra Part III(C) (citing Carol Sanger).
3 See, e.g., Interview with Legal Director, State Advocacy Organization (Apr. 28,
2009) (attorneys); Interview with Director, State Advocacy Organization (Oct. 16, 2009)
(clerk).
313 Interview with Lawyer (Apr. 29, 2009).3 14 Id.
"' See, e.g., Interview with Juvenile Court Administrator (Apr. 17, 2009); see also
BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 45.
316 Transcript of Judge's Conments (Dec. 10, 2009) (on file with the author).
" BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 56.
31 Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 393.
319 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 54.
320 Id. at 54-56.
[Vol. 34216
Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance
Advocacy groups for women's or reproductive rights might be helpful on
this score.321
New governance strategies take planning and time. This level of col-
laboration and coordination is difficult, but not impossible given that some
interviewees accomplish the tasks described here. New roles for some local
actors, however, may not allay the concerns of those skeptical of new gov-
ernance and its attendant ambiguity.3 2  The risks of delineating space for
voluntary and informal decision-making are explored in the next section.
C. Risks of a New Governance Approach
Enthusiasm for new governance should not elide its potential costs.
This section acknowledges the difficulty of identifying stakeholders; doubts
about the efficacy of voluntary compliance; disagreement about goals of re-
form; the lack of transparency in conversations among bypass participants;
and the potential of new governance to entrench inequality. Reflecting on
these dilemmas might prompt those committed to changing the present sys-
tem to consider what consequences they will tolerate.
Ideas that animate new governance already underpin some scholarship
concerned with conflicting rights of family members.3 23 Martha Fineman
also points to feminists' use of women's experiences to challenge state re-
sponses to "gendered violence, reproductive rights, and the relationship be-
tween husband and wife, as well as the construction of gendered roles in the
family."3 24 However, documenting women's "lived experience" of law does
not always sit easily with the new governance move away from state moni-
toring and enforcement of individual rights. 325 Feminist agendas have relied
on social science data to convince the state to penalize abuse perpetrators, to
formalize equality protections in custody and property division for spouses,
and to press for constitutional rights for reproductive privacy.3 26
321 See Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 274, at 523
(describing intermediaries in the gender bias context).
322 But see Formulating a New Paradigm, supra note 266, at 497 (describing "ambi-
guity as an opportunity" for regulation).
323 See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American
Family, 32 RUTGERs L.J. 711, 725 (2000-2001) (arguing for a more nuanced, fact sensi-
tive, and flexible approach to policies that seek to resolve competing interests within the
family). See generally PAULINE TESSLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE
(2007) (describing methods of resolving contentious divorce outside of litigation that
relies on parties' communication and collaboration).
324 Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and the Law: Feminist Legal Theory's Role in
New Legal Realism, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 405, 418 (2005).
325 See id. at 418, 428 (noting that a feminist contribution to legal reform was chal-
lenging and changing categorical rules, such as in divorce; elsewhere arguing, in the
context of caretaking, that the state must redistribute income and restructure the work-
place); see also NeJaime, supra note 17, at 328 (arguing that identity politics are closely
connected to court-centered models).
326 Fineman, supra note 324, at 417-18, 426 ("ask questions that translate the find-
ings of social science into a framework for reformulating legal policy").
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It seems reasonable, then, that feminists and others might question why
advocates for reform should rely on decision-making processes that govern-
ments and courts cannot enforce.327 Orly Lobel, justifying new governance
methods, suggests that "building deliberative and collaborative capacities"
can entice "individuals [to] follow norms against their immediate self-inter-
est, even in the absence of the threat of formal regulatory sanction."3 28
However, this may not meet the concerns of those who suspect that collabo-
ration is not possible without a shared set of understandings.32 9 If the popu-
larity of parental involvement laws is any indication, it might be difficult to
get clerks, lawyers, and judges, for example, to agree that the current system
is broken in the first place.33 0
Even when professionals agree about the desirability of increasing mi-
nors' access to court and clinic services, there may be significant disagree-
ment about why such reform is necessary. Perhaps new governance
literature grapples less with the fragmentation of stakeholder interests be-
cause it has traditionally taken hold in areas where there is general agree-
ment about the nature of the social problem at issue. Employment
discrimination, for example, is generally considered undesirable and a prob-
lem that should be eradicated (despite disagreements over the definition of
discrimination). Professionals who help minors circumvent parental consul-
tation may do so for various reasons, but not because they disagree with
parental consent laws generally. Those who believe that minors should have
rights to make autonomous abortion decisions may come to different conclu-
sions about the best way forward than those who believe that parental in-
volvement laws are valuable yet poorly executed. 33 1
Reaching consensus on the goals of reform may result in an overly
centrist approach that seeks compromise and avoids hard debates about pa-
rental authority and teenage sexuality.332 Because new governance concen-
trates on improving the forums for shared decision-making, it is naturally
327 See Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and
Selves, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 501, 535 (2008) (reviewing THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR (Andrea Kupfer
Schneider & Christoper Honeyman eds., 2006)) (arguing that law's role in a new govern-
ance framework is a "conceptually incoherent strategy" that may entrench inequalities
among would-be collaborators).
328 Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 384.
329 Douglas NeJaime raises this point by referencing the movement and countermove-
ment politics of the Christian Right, which arguably gain traction by staking out opposi-
tion to certain social justice agendas, such as gay rights campaigns. See, e.g., NeJaime,
supra note 17, at 358.
330 WHO DECIDES, supra note 91, at 158 (noting popularity of laws).
33 See REPORT ON A MEETING, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that some professionals see
a benefit to parental involvement laws because it gives them a chance to tell minors about
contraceptive use, or the hearing reaffirms their decision once they are found to be
mature).
332 See NeJaime, supra note 17, at 343-44 (arguing that new governance is "decid-
edly centrist[J,] . . . giving advocates a way to devise governance systems that seek to
bring about progressive change through centrist means").
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focused on procedural mechanisms. 3 As the next section contemplates,
professionals participating in bypass hearings might disagree about the value
of abortion access, but may support proposals for creating a floor of basic
fairness-ensuring the availability of forms and instructions or conducting
trainings for volunteer attorneys, clinic staff, and county clerks on what the
law entails. These actions may improve the process, but they might discour-
age a substantive conversation about the values that animate parental in-
volvement laws.
One reason for muting a debate about the value of parental consultation
is the fear that putting the issue on the public's "radar" will attract negative
attention and result in legislatures making laws more restrictive.33 4 New
governance proposals, however, typically seek to shed light on new policies
by having a transparent, open process of participation. For example, Susan
Sturm's work in employment discrimination depends on clearly articulated,
well-publicized internal policies for which courts can hold employers ac-
countable.335 This transparency provides a check on the power of private
actors: policies that transfer discretion to non-state actors should monitor
how private actors manage public resources or legal rights.336 Moreover,
open and participatory processes seek to restrain dominant stakeholders'
power. Without transparency, reform can lack accountability, exacerbating
the problems of enforcement raised at the beginning of this section and jeop-
ardizing the perceived legitimacy of collaborative reform.3
A new governance approach may assume that stakeholders come to col-
laboration with their interests already clearly defined.338 A "rational actor"
approach sits uneasily with parental involvement laws, which start from the
premise that a key stakeholder-the pregnant minor-may not have the ca-
pacity to make mature decisions.339 Discussions about parental involvement
laws have largely excluded the opinions and voices of young women.3 o
. See id. at 358 ("substantive agreement based on process norms").
33 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 47.
. Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 278, at 254.
336 Formulating a New Paradigm, supra note 266, at 453, 464.
1 See Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US 323, 331 (2006) ("Unless accountability
concerns are built in[ ] . . . participants may not reflect the perspectives of the larger
group and may not be perceived as legitimate proxies . . . .").
338 Cohen, supra note 327, at 538-39 ("[N]ew governance scholars also envision a
certain sort of person: one who flourishes through surprise, finding possibilities in alter-
native conceptions of one's interests and ends and thus forging unexpected alliances
across differences.").
.. See Trubek, supra note 267, at 156-57 (discussing new governance emphasis on
"economic and informational incentives" that allow "the individual using her market
power" to manage and make choices about her own health care).
34 The Partnership's study, for example, did not include interviews with minors.
BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 9; see also WHO DECIDES, supra note 91, at 71
(noting that "the voices of young women were missing in debates about parental involve-
ment laws").
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Giving minors a seat at the table would require repositioning young women
as collaborators and not just patients, clients, or petitioners.
This last concern contemplates what power differentials a new govern-
ance strategy will maintain and implicitly bless.341 Amy Cohen questions
new governance's ability to realign individuals' and groups' interests through
collaboration or negotiation.342 New governance is not a neutral enterprise,
but as Cohen demonstrates, "reproduce[s] th[e] conviction that collabora-
tion and efficiency are mutually reinforcing values at the level of individual
consciousness. In fact, what these skills foundationally teach lower-power
parties are techniques to transform their desires and ends into interests ...
that, if achieved, can mutually serve the desires and ends of higher-power
parties."343 Even when an improved system fails, minors will still bear the
costs. If a goal of reform is to empower young women, then a new govern-
ance model should try to balance minors' underrepresented interests with the
interests of the judges, lawyers, clinicians, and clerks who assist them. For
example, lawyers might. save time, and thus be able to represent more mi-
nors, if they require all their clients to meet them at their offices or at the
courts in which they practice. Although this measure may help a lawyer
better respond to requests for representation, it would further isolate rural
minors, exacerbating an asymmetry of resources between urban and rural
teens. An uncritical approach to young women's roles might inadvertently
cast them as the subjects of legal and clinical processes, and not active col-
laborators. The challenge for new governance, taken up by the next section,
is to create a system that cuts against existing inequality and minimizes con-
cerns of enforcement and transparency.
D. A Framework for a New Bypass Process?
Rather than view these risks as reasons to abandon new governance, we
might think of them as opportunities to consider how aspects of new govern-
ance can address even the most contentious social issues. This section at-
tempts to help illustrate how a collaborative approach might apply to the
interactions of local actors implementing consent and notice standards. The
approach described here will not work in every jurisdiction because the pro-
fessionals involved, their interests and roles, and the law that sets boundaries
for innovation varies.
When viewed at the level of local, informal negotiation, the interests of
those that interact with pregnant minors may have more in common than one
1i Cohen, supra note 327, at 539-40 (describing how "new governance efforts to
empower citizens to instrumentalize their interests and achieve their ends are also them-
selves practices of power intended to shape and constrain these interests and ends").
342 Id. at 539-40.
-
41 Id. at 541.
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would suspect.3 * Many judges are committed to upholding the law and have
an interest in defending the reputation of the judiciary. They may have a
related interest in making the bypass less of an administrative burden. For
the judges who have had little or no training on parental involvement laws,
they may want to avoid reversal by an appellate court. Clerks seek clarity
about the duty to keep bypass files confidential, and with full dockets to
manage, they may also have an interest in creating an effective process.
Likewise, lawyers have limited time and may have inadequate information
about how to represent minors. They too have a need for a clear and expedi-
tious process.
Clinic personnel are similarly invested in developing an efficient pro-
cess and fully understanding the law, although concerns about liability may
inform their interest. Providers need assurances that assistance they give to
minors seeking a bypass will not be used to accuse them of coercion or as
evidence of complicity if parents sue under consent or notice laws.345 Social
workers and school counselors who advise minors may have a similar inter-
est in avoiding institutional liability or reprimand from their supervisors.
The overlapping needs of these actors focus on procedural clarity, se-
curity in sharing information, and reducing logistical burdens. These inter-
ests come together in the creation of specific tools that ease procedural and
informational obstacles, such as checklists for clinical intake staff, model
court forms and available instructions, and technological aids.3 46 Experi-
menting with technology, like using teleconferences for hearings, can offer
the added advantage of being able to keep pace with the evolving needs of a
jurisdiction.3 47
New governance strategies suggest not only identifying interests but
also delineating roles according to the resources available. For example,
roles for clinical and legal professionals may align along the general duties
of managers, information brokers, data collectors, monitors, and catalysts.
The group or individual in the management or oversight role must have
the veneer of authority to coordinate between professionals who voluntarily
participate in reform.3 48 Judges often have that legitimacy, and one commit-
ted judge can change the culture of a local system. For example, a judge
' See NeJaime, supra note 17, at 336 ("New Governance also distinguishes itself
from informal justice regimes, such as mediation, alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
and arbitration."). Future research might usefully consider how to marry informal gov-
ernance and new governance. One interesting area of inquiry is health care decision-
making and delivery for minors in state or foster care.
- See supra Part II(B) (provider practices that reflect liability fears) & Part III(C)
(legislative proposals that heighten the liability concerns of providers).
16 See BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 55. Interestingly, the Alaska notice law
provides for a teleconference for a minor who is unable to attend a hearing-an argument
for the potential of shaping legislative language, despite the doubts expressed in Part II of
this Article. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(n)(4) (2010).
" See Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 274, at 516
(describing the influence of technology in shaping employer accountability).
" See, e.g., id. at 498.
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could serve as the hub of a county's bypass process by ensuring that the
clerks in her court know how to handle a bypass; establishing a routine for
hearings on which the lawyers that appear routinely before her rely; and
opening channels of communication with local providers about the docu-
mentation the court needs (proof of completion of counseling requirements,
for example).3 49
Lawyers serve as a natural conduit for information about the gap be-
tween the text and practice of law. They have experience in interpreting
statutory language, and they are in courts, representing minors in bypass
hearings, as law is applied. Lawyers acting as information brokers might
ensure that clinics, clerks, and judges are aware of changes in the law and of
practices that affect law's implementation-alerting providers or advocates,
for example, when a judge or clerk retires. Moreover, lawyers' professional
networks are often well-positioned to influence how the legal system works.
For example, in one state, lawyers volunteered to serve on the court rules
committee and helped draft rules that made the bypass petitioner's tasks less
complicated.350 In another state, lawyers worked through their bar council to
train volunteer attorneys for bypass hearings.35'
Clinics also collect data, but the information they maintain is of a dif-
ferent kind. Minors seeking an abortion often contact providers first, so
clinic staff may have the most knowledge about who needs a bypass and
why.352 Providers could serve as the liaison between the public interests of
the legal system (concerned with the fairness of the process) and private
interests geared toward advocating on behalf of the young woman (focused
on the subjective experience of the minor). Clinic counselors or education
specialists can help minors understand what courts will require and assist
lawyers in understanding their clients' particular needs or perspective. Simi-
larly, a sympathetic staff member at a high school or community center
could help canvass the opinions of minors about the parental involvement
process in order to inform collaboration among clinical and legal
professionals.
Finally, pro-choice groups have an interest in making sure the system
actually provides abortion access for minors, and youth advocacy groups
have an interest in young women's rights to autonomy. These interests un-
derscore a role for monitoring the efficacy of collaboration and providing a
catalyst for reform.353 As monitors, they can verify that information is up to
date and that different system participants are fulfilling their roles. Like
34 Interview with Judge (Nov. 14, 2008).
350 Interview with Lawyer (Sept. 3, 2008); see also BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9,
at 29.
35 Interview with Lawyer (July 7, 2009).
352 BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 34.
353 See id. at 56 ("In some locations it might make the most sense for statewide civil-
rights groups, youth advocacy organizations or women's rights nonprofits to take a coor-
dinating role . . . .").
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clinics, they can ensure that whatever system is in place takes account of the
particular needs of marginalized minors and meets the broader interests of
social justice.354 As catalysts, non-profit advocacy organizations can start a
conversation about the need for change, perhaps supported by private fund-
ing that can create the procedural and informational tools described in this
section.
New governance supporters argue that procedure and rules can help
police a collaborative process and assure participants that power imbalances
do not distort participation. 355 The text of parental involvement laws can be
hospitable ground for new governance solutions. Too commonly, perhaps
because of losses in courts and statehouses, the letter of the law has been the
enemy of reform. Yet consent and notice statutes confer broad discretion to
clinics and courts through terms like "reasonable means" or "maturity." A
new collaborative process might make the most of this discretion in order to
open access points to the legal system, while maintaining statutes' ability to
reign in potential abuses.356
CONCLUSION
New governance may not be the perfect fit for parental involvement
laws. Power differentials, lack of will, entrenched debates about abortion,
and problems of transparency are formidable obstacles. But, at present, the
alternative appears to be living with a status quo that only enables adver-
sarial positions of individuals or entities to ossify and poses significant costs
to pregnant young women.' Collaboration might help "elaborate" norms
from the bottom-up, so that the values sabotaging effective abortion access
for minors change gradually.358 Viewed in this way, new governance em-
beds an ambitious, problem-solving agenda that can influence behavior at
the margins with an eye toward moving to the center.3 59
354 Some state advocacy organizations, for example, provide funding for lower in-
come minors or transportation for rural minors. See, e.g., EMERGENCY MEDICAL Assis-
TANCE INC., http://www.emawpb.org/whoweserve.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010)
(providing funding and possibly travel expenses for minors and adult women).
"s See Cohen, supra note 327, at 533 (noting that new governance theorists argue
that collaboration can be a fair process through procedural safeguards).
356 Renew Deal, supra note 265, at 392 (noting that areas where law has been diffi-
cult to enforce can be a tool for "law-in-action flexibility").
35 Id. at 394-95.
. See Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 274, at 555.
3 Id. at 471, 520 (advocating a problem-solving model).
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